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United States v. Virginia's New
Gender Equal Protection Analysis
with Ramifications for Pregnancy,
Parenting, and Title VII
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer 50 Vand. L. Rev. 845 (1997)
In this Article, Professor Kovacic-liTeischer argues that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Virginia raises gender equal
protection analysis to the level of strict scrutiny. Professor Kovacic-Fleischer
asserts that the Court's refusal to accept as immutable VMI's single-sex
institutional design, and the Court's requirement that VMT make adjustments
and alterations that will enable qualified women to undertake VM's
curriculum evidences this shift in gender equal protection analysis.
Professor Kovacic-Fleischer then turns to the significance of the
Court's citation to California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.
She asserts that this citation indicates that the Court effectively overruled
Geduldig v. Aiello's holding that pregnancy discrimination is not necessarily
sex-based discrimination. Further, she asserts that the Guerra citation also
indicates that United States v. Virginia's adjustments and alterations model
of gender equal protection analysis is applicable to Title VII. Under this
analysis, workplaces would be required to make adjustments and alterations
designed to accommodate pregnancy and parenting. Professor Kovacic-
Fleischer concludes that such adjustments and alterations would prove eco-
nomically beneficial to employers and would facilitate equal allocation of
work and responsibilities within families.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States challenged Virginia Military Institute's
("VMI") male-only admissions policy in United States v. Virginia,, the
latest gender equal protection case to reach the Supreme Court. The
opinion, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, is remarkable in
several ways. It balances two debated viewpoints for achieving gender
equality: whether governmental policies should provide equal
treatment or equal results for men and women. It achieves this
balance by requiring VMI to admit only capable women and, where
necessary, to make adjustments and alterations to facilitate their
admission. United States v. Virginia's balance between the different
approaches for achieving equality appears to raise gender equal
protection analysis to the level of strict scrutiny and to alter
constitutional disparate impact analysis. In addition, the Court's
citation to a Title VII2 pregnancy leave case can be read both to apply
Title VII's pregnancy analysis to the Constitution and to require the
application of United States v. Virginia's institutional redesign for
equality analysis to Title VII pregnancy and parenting cases. These
developments could have significant ramifications for governmental
and workplace policies.
Part II of this Article briefly describes both the VMI litigation
and some of the viewpoints of policymakers and scholars with respect
to gender equality and policies affecting reproduction and parenting.
1. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996), rev'g, 44 F.3d 1229
(4th Cir. 1995), and 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).




to gender equality and policies affecting reproduction and parenting.
Part II then analyzes how United States v. Virginia balances
viewpoints for achieving equality by requiring VMI to admit women
who can succeed in its demanding environment, while at the same
time requiring it to make changes to accommodate "celebrated"
differences between men and women with respect to physical strength
and privacy. This Part explains that requiring institutional
accommodations for "celebrated" differences neither denigrates
women nor makes them appear to be the "inferior" sex. These
mandated institutional changes do not "lower standards" for women;
rather, in order to maximize the talents of both genders they redesign
standards that were initially, and unnecessarily, established only for
men.
Part III analyzes how the requirement of institutional redesign
changes gender equal protection analysis. This Part describes current
midtier gender equal protection analysis and United States v.
Virginia's departure from that analysis. The new analysis resembles
both Title VII and strict scrutiny constitutional cases, and calls into
question the continuing validity of some prior gender equal protection
cases. This Part further describes how United States v. Virginia's
reliance upon remedial racial equal protection cases is consistent with
heightened gender equal protection scrutiny.
Part IV asserts that United States v. Virginia effectively
overrules Geduldig v. Aiello,3 the Supreme Court case holding that
pregnancy discrimination is not necessarily sex discrimination per se
under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The conclusion that pregnancy
discrimination is now viewed as sex discrimination under the
Constitution follows from the Court's reasoning that the Fourteenth
Amendment is violated when "some women" are discriminated
against and from the Court's citation to California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra,5 a Title VII pregnancy leave case.
Part IV further asserts that United States v. Virginia's
institutional alteration analysis can be applied to Title VII. This
result also follows from the Court's citation to Guerra, and because
pregnancy can be compared to the physical gender characteristic of
strength addressed by the VMI case. This would require employers to
provide expectant mothers with paid leave so that they can retain
3. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
4. Id. at 494.
5. 479 U.S. 272 (1987), cited in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
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their jobs and pay, just as expectant fathers do when their children
are born.
Part IV asserts, by analogizing parenting to privacy, both of
which are based on a combination of physical differences between the
sexes and social norms, that the institutional alteration analysis of
United States v. Virginia requires employers to accommodate par-
enting obligations. The accommodations would be ordered first for
mothers, who typically have more childcare responsibilities than men,
and then for fathers, so that they would not be treated differently
from women. The workplace thus would be restructured to
accommodate the familial obligations of its workers and would
internalize some of the costs of family work, which traditionally have
been borne by families without recompense even though childcare
benefits the workplace. This Part notes the potential problems for
women that singling out family concerns in the workplace could have,
but asserts that failure to address those concerns causes women
greater problems.
Extending the analysis in United States v. Virginia to Title VII
involves a departure from some of the legislative history of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,6 but Part IV discusses precedents for
applying Title VII broadly but consistently with its purpose. This
Part briefly discusses possible alterations that courts or legislatures
could require workplaces to make, or that employers could implement
voluntarily. This Part also discusses possible defenses that
employers might raise to court- or legislatively-ordered institutional
changes. It concludes that institutional alterations made for
societally imposed differences between the sexes will begin to elimi-
nate those differences and will have enormous potential both for
furthering equality for women and men, and for improving the lives of
children.7
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
7. This Article does not discuss the ramifications of United States v. Virginia for single-
sex education generally. With respect to education, the case appears to be limited to its facts.
In a footnote, the opinion references the uniqueness of the educational opportunity at VMI, a
premier male-only military institute. 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7 (citing United States v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991); United States v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992)). Pointing to the fact that VMI is
Virginia's sole single-sex public university or college, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at
2269, Justice Ginsburg quoted Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan's statement that it
was "not faced with the question of whether States can provide 'separate but equal'
undergraduate institutions for males and females." Id. at 2276 n.7 (quoting Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982)). The footnote acknowledges that many amici
supported single-sex education and quotes without comment from an amicus brief that single-
1997] 849
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II. THE DEBATE BETWEEN EQUAL TREATMENT AND EQUAL RESULTS
A. The VMI Litigation
Virginia Military Institute is, as its name indicates, a military-
styled school of higher education. It was founded in 1839 with an all-
male admissions policy, and continues to be supported and controlled
by the Commonwealth of Virginia. By the 1970s, VMI was the only
single-sex public college in Virginia, and its "impressive record in
producing leaders ha[d] made admission [to VMI] desirable to some
women."8 VMI's exclusion of women became an issue of litigation in
1990. At the request of a potential woman applicant, the Department
of Justice brought suit in the Western District of Virginia claiming
that VMI's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. After trial the district court rejected the
claim, finding that the male-only school offered diversity to Virginia's
higher educational system and that "that diversity was 'enhanced by
VMI's unique method of instruction' ":9 the "adversative method."10
That method includes "[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute
equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values."11 Cadets are housed
"in spartan barracks where surveillance is constant and privacy
nonexistent" and subjected to a seven-month "rat line."12 In the rat
line the cadets are tormented by upperclassmen to encourage bonding
to "their fellow sufferers" and, after completion of the rat line,
bonding to "their former tormentors."13 The district court found that
sex education can "dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications." Id.
(quoting Brief for Twenty-Six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae at 5), United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996) (available on LEXIS, GENFED library,
BRIEFS file)). In its text, United States v. Virginia says that "[s]ex classifications may be used
to compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities...' [and] to 'promot[e] equal
employment opportunity."' Id. at 2276 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977);
Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289). That statement could support the constitutionality of the single-sex
schools identified by the amici.
8. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
9. Id. at 2271 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415).
10. Id. at 2269.
11. Id. at 2270 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1421).
12 Id. (citing United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1422, 1424).
13. Id. (citing United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1422). For
further descriptions of the "adversative method," see Allan Ides, The Curious Case of the
Virginia Military Institute: An Essay on the Judicial Function, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35, 36
n.6 (1993); Charles J. Russo and Susan J. Scollay, All Male State-Funded Military Academies:
Anachronism or Necessary Anomaly, 82 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1073, 1075-76 (1993); Jon Allyn
Soderberg, Essay, The Virginia Military Institute and the Equal Protection Clause: A Factual
850 [Vol. 50:845
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if women were admitted to VMI, " 'some aspects of the [schoors]
distinctive method would be altered'.... 'Allowance for personal
privacy would have to be made,' [and] '[p]hysical education require-
ments would have to be altered, at least for the women.' "14
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that
diversity provided only to men was constitutional, but remanded for a
determination of the appropriate remedy.15 The Fourth Circuit
proposed three alternative remedies: admitting women; providing
"parallel institutions or programs"; or privatizing VMI.16 On remand,
the district court approved a "substantively comparable" program, the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL") at Mary Baldwin
College, a private women's college in Virginia.17 The Fourth Circuit
then affirmed, over one dissent,s and later denied rehearing en banc,
with four judges dissenting.19 The Supreme Court, in a seven to one
judgment, with Justice Clarence Thomas taking no part in the opin-
ion,20 reversed the Fourth Circuit.21 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
wrote the majority opinion for six justices. 2 2  Chief Justice William
Rehnquist concurred separately;23 Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.24
After detailing many inadequacies of the VWIL program as
compared with VMI,2 5 the Court held that Virginia did not prove that
and Legal Introduction, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 15, 16-17 (1993); Kristin S. Caplice, Note, The
Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 227, 273-74 (1994); Brian Scott
Yablonski, Comment, Marching to the Beat of a Different Drummer: The Case of the Virginia
Military Institute, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 1449, 1468-70 (1993); Melissa Taylor, Note, The VMI
Decision: A Look at the Balancing Process in Equal Protection Cases, 60 UMKC L. Rev. 393, 393
(1991). See generally Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, The New Yorker 62 (Sept. 5, 1994)
(describing in graphic detail life at the Citadel, a formerly all-male state-run military institute
in South Carolina, before the admission of women).
14. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2271 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth
of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1413).
15. Id. at 2271-72.
16. Id. at 2272 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900).
17. Id. at 2273, 2286 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 44 F.3d at
1237).
18. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1242 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
19. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 F.3d at 90 (Motz, J., dissenting, joined
by Hall, Murnaghan, and Michael, JJ.).
20. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287. News accounts reported that Justice
Thomas's son attends VMI and speculated that that was the reason for the Justice's recusal.
See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, Like Race, Like Gender?, New Republic 21 (Feb. 19, 1996).
21. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287.
22. Id. at 2269.
23. Id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
24, Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2283-86.
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those "separate educational opportunities" were substantially equal.26
The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's initial ruling that the single-
sex admission at VMI violated equal protection, but reversed the
Fourth Circuit's approval of VWIL as an appropriate remedy.27 The
remedy the Court suggested appears to combine two differing
viewpoints about appropriate policies concerning gender.
B. Viewpoints on Gender Equality28
1. Equal Treatment
One theory about how to achieve gender equality is the equal
treatment model, also called the "sameness" or equal opportunity
model. Under this model governmental policies must treat women
and men equally in all respects. Any differential treatment based on
gender, proponents of this viewpoint believe, can be used to denigrate
women and deny them employment and other opportunities. 29 Even
differential treatment that accommodates women for childbirth or
breast feeding can harm women in the workplace by presenting them
as inferior and ultimately restricting their opportunities in the work-
place.3 0 Thus, proponents of the equal treatment model advocate that
governments and employers treat women and men equally.
26. Id. at 2286.
27. Id. at 2286-87.
28. This description, because of its brevity and focus on contrast, necessarily
oversimplifies the various viewpoints and minimizes their commonalities. For excellent
descriptions of the debate, see, for example, Herma Hill Kay and Martha S. West, Ensuring
Non-Discrimination, Sex-Based Discrimination 767-73 (West, 4th ed. 1996); Martha Minow,
Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 40-48, 56-60 (Cornell U.,
1990); Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex" Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1536, 1560-68 (1995); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the
Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 Hastings L. J. 471, 477-86 (1990); Kathryn
Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev.
1183, 1184-97 (1989); Anne-Marie Leath Storey, Note, An Analysis of the Doctrines and Goals of
Feminist Legal Theory and Their Constitutional Implications, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 137, 151-65 (1994);
John D. Gibson, Note, Childbearing and Childrearing: Feminists and Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev.
1145, 1169-72 (1987).
29. Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law 117-25
(Harvard U., 1989); John E. Morrison, Viva la Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the Difference
Dilemma, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 973, 973-974 (1994); Nadine Taub, Thoughts on Living and Moving
with the Recurring Divide, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 965, 965-69 (1990); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's
Riddle. Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 325, 351-70 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Reflections on
Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 175, 195-200 (1982).
30. See generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1
Berkeley Women's L. J. 1, 34 n.169, 35 n.174 (1985) (arguing for episodic recognition of
necessary biological reproductive differences between men and women).
852 [Vol. 50:845
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Equal treatment proponents argue that pregnancy is one of
many "workplace disabilities" for which adequate fringe benefits are
necessary for all people.31 Pregnancy should not be singled out for
special treatment because that would create resentment in others
with workplace disabilities. Some equal treatment proponents
suggest that because human milk can be expressed and stored, babies
can have the special nutritional value of human milk without employ-
ers having to make special arrangements for breast feeding.32
Some proponents of the equal treatment model support gender
neutral policies that accommodate the family,"3 while others fear that
policies accommodating parenting will be used disproportionately by
women, creating the same problems that gender specific policies
create. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 199334 al-
lows both men and women to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave
from companies of fifty or more employees to care for newborns or sick
family members. Some argue that more women than men will use the
leave, which will make employers reluctant to hire women or give
them positions of responsibility.' 5
31. See, for example, Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 327, 336, 357 (cited in
note 29); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1188 (cited in note 28); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 1003-06 (1984).
32. See generally Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 35 n.174 (cited in note 30); Williams,
13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 360 n.135 (cited in note 29) (expressing ambivalence about
breast feeding as a difference to be taken into account, and suggesting it should not be a reason
to oppress women, but should instead be a choice). This Author believes that breast feeding is
an extraordinary and fleeting experience that should be available to all mothers who desire it,
especially because expressing milk takes special efforts of time and privacy. Flexible scheduling
or baby-at-work programs may facilitate breast feeding. See notes 325-26, 331.
33. See, for example, Mary Ann Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for
Women Workers, 6 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol. 393, 408-14 (1992) (recommending
structural changes in the workplace that benefit both parents); Mark S. Kende, Shattering the
Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46
Hastings L. J. 17, 63-79 (1994) (arguing that using concepts of fiduciary duty and implied
covenants of good faith can equalize the workplace for men and women); Williams, 13 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 325 (cited in note 29).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed.).
35. See Cristina Duarte, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Paying the Price for
an Imperfect Solution, 32 U. Louisville J. Family L. 833, 846 (1994). See also Richard A. Posner,
Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. Chi. Legal Forum 191, 197; Deirdre A. Whittaker, Note,
Should We Have a National Leave Policy: A Survey of Leave Policies, Problems and Solutions,
34 Howard L. J. 411, 415 (1991) (describing and countering arguments against the FMLA). For
a discussion of the "mommy track," see Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Robert Saut6, Bonnie Oglensky,
and Martha Gever, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal
Profession, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 291 (1995); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1237 n.197 (cited in
note 28).
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The equal treatment model is said to be assimilationist.36 It
assumes that existing governmental and workplace policies can as-
similate the excluded gender because there are no relevant differences
between the genders. This model for gender equality is consistent
with that generally used to combat racial discrimination and is exem-
plified by much of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.37
2. Equal Results
Another theory is the equal results model, also called the
"difference" or special treatment model. This model posits that in
order to achieve equal results, governmental policies must recognize
and accommodate inherent differences between the sexes. It assumes
that these differences preclude assimilation, and that equal treatment
in the face of these differences produces unequal results.3 8 For exam-
ple, although a woman must take time from work to give birth to a
child, a man can continue to work while his child is born. Thus, pro-
ponents of the equal results model say that employment policies that
do not provide pregnancy leave disadvantage women, but not men, for
having a child.39 While these proponents agree that employers should
provide leave for all people with workplace disabilities, they believe
36. Equal treatment proponents believe that women should be assimilated into a world
expanded to include their values. See, for example, Nadine Taub and Wendy W. Williams, Will
Equality Require More Than Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation from the Existing
Social Structure?, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 825, 832-44 (1985).
37. See generally Kay and West, Ensuring Non-Discrimination at 767 (cited in note 28).
Even the assimilation model recognizes that the effects of past discrimination may prevent
immediate assimilation. Much debate exists as to whether "affirmative action" can or should be
taken under Title VII to rectify past discrimination. Compare the differing opinions in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995).
38. See, for example, Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 21-22 (cited in note 30) (advocating
equal treatment except for recognition of physical differences between the sexes during the
"episodic" times of the difference); Linda J. Krieger and Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl
Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 Golden
Gate U. L. Rev. 513, 536-64 (1983); Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet, and Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 Buff. L.
Rev. 573, 573-83 (1987); Linda Hassberg, Comment, Toward Gender Equality: Testing the
Applicability of a Broader Discrimination Standard in the Workplace, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 217
(1992) (arguing that formal equality ignores biological and cultural differences between men and
women).
39. See Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 27, 35 (cited in note 30). See also Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1299 (1987) ("[Working women
and men share a right to procreative choice in addition to an interest in disability leave. In
order to ensure equal exercise of procreative rights... an employer must provide leave
adequate to the effects of pregnancy."); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and
Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82
Geo. L. J. 193, 198-202 (1993) (arguing that the workplace must accommodate pregnancy to
secure women's participation in it). See also note 237 and accompanying text.
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that employers will not provide, or be required to provide, such uni-
versal leave in the imminent future.40 Maintenance of the status quo
while waiting for the workplace to institute ideal policies continues
the disadvantageous position of women. Policies that require accep-
tance of inherent differences between the sexes create the impetus for
the implementation of policies providing greater benefits for workers
of both sexes. 4' Recognition that there are inherent differences
between the sexes is not a recognition that women are inferior; it is
merely a recognition that they are different. Requiring institutional
changes for these differences is not a statement that women are not
"good enough" to fit in; instead, it is a statement that the institution
is not designed to maximize the talents of everyone.
Similarly, pointing to studies demonstrating that mothers
currently do a disproportionate amount of childrearing, many equal
results proponents argue that equal treatment of mothers and fathers
will disadvantage mothers until fathers assume equal responsibility
for parenting.42 Thus, employment policies that do not make alterations
to accommodate parenting disproportionately disadvantage women. As a
result, many women fall behind in pay, prestige, and job security, or
they do not have children at all.4 A Yale psychology professor found
40. Compare note 333 (discussing leave benefits provided in foreign countries and
suggesting that it is unlikely that such benefits would be provided in the United States).
41. See, for example, text accompanying notes 93-98.
42. See, for example, Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. Family L.
1, 23-24 (1990) (stating that "after years of efforts [to make childrearing the equal responsibility
of mothers and fathers] women still bear the major responsibility for children in two-parent
households"); Scott Caplan-Cotenoff, Note, Parental Leave: The Need for a National Policy to
Foster Sexual Equality, 13 Am. J. L. & Med. 71, 87-89 (1987); Krieger and Cooney, 13 Golden
Gate L. Rev. at 515 (cited in note 38). See also notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
43. See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff and Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2154, 2215 (1994)
(stating that women's discontinuity in work is a major factor in lowering women's wages); Leslie
Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 941, 952 (1989)
(discussing the impact of motherhood on women's roles in the workplace); Jeremy I. Bohrer,
Recent Development, You, Me, and the Consequences of Family: How Federal Employment Law
Prevents the Shattering of the "Glass Ceiling", 50 Wash. U. J. Urban & Contemp. L. 401, 419
(1996) (noting that when women have to choose between career and family they often resign
themselves to low.paying jobs); Kathryn Branch, Note, Are Women Worth as Much as Men?:
Employment Inequities, Gender Roles, and Public Policy, 1 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol. 119, 124-27
(1994) (arguing that women will not be equal until the workplace accommodates parenting and
men choose to commit to family); Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into
Account, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 699, 706 (1986) (stating that the workplace's reluctance to
accommodate childbirth and parental responsibilities contributes to the differences in
employment status of men and women); Duarte, 32 U. Louisville J. Family L. at 838, 865 (cited
in note 35) (stating that stereotypes and business practices force women to choose between
family and career). See also note 381.
1997] 855
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
from a pool of women with corporate-financial careers that "[a]bout
half were unmarried, slightly more childless," and "[b]oth the benefits
and the costs of this life were substantial."44 Most men, however, can
reap substantial employment benefits without having to pay the cost
of childlessness.45
The equal results model has been called "incorporationist."46 It
assumes that the workplace can incorporate biological, but not
stereotypical, differences into the definition of equality.47  It is
consistent with some of the antidiscrimination statutes that recognize
that current institutional norms have the effect of excluding talented
people who do not fit the norm. These statutes require employers to
make accomodations to provide job opportunities to people different
from the traditional employee. An example is section 701(j) of Title
VII,4 which requires employers to make accommodations for people's
religious practices. Another is the Americans with Disabilities Act,49
which requires employers and others to make institutional alterations
and accommodations for people with physical and mental differences.
The incorporationist model is also seen in statutes requiring
employers to protect the jobs of people in the military50
3. Other Debates and Theories
Within both theories debate exists as to the extent of inherent
differences between men and women. While the existence of biologi-
President Clinton's first two nominees for Attorney General withdrew because they had
hired illegal immigrants as nannies. The Attorney General finally appointed was Janet Reno,
an unmarried woman without children. See Issacharoff and Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at
2154-55 (cited in this note).
44. Daniel J. Levinson, The Seasons of a Woman's Life 11 (Knoff, 1996).
45. See note 244. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 Yale L. J. 1373, 1382 n.46 (1986) 'Equality requires that a woman not be forced to
choose between children and career, just as a man need not make that choice"); Krieger and
Cooney, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. at 533 (cited in note 38) (arguing that pregnancy leave
"places women on an equal footing with men").
46. See Kay and West, Enduring Non-Discrimination at 770 (cited in note 28) (quoting
Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L. Rev. 375 (1980-81)).
47. Dowd, 54 Fordham L. Rev. at 764 (cited in note 43).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
49. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994
ed.).
50. See Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. (1994 ed.). See
generally Judith Bernstein Gaeta, Kolkhorst v. Tilghman: An Employee's Right to Military
Leave Under the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev. 259 (1991) (discussing
a Fourth Circuit case holding that employee-reservists have an unconditional right to military
leave and subsequent reemployment); Annotation, Re-employment of Discharged Servicemen, 29
A.L.R.2d 1279 (1953) (discussing the history of reemployment legislation and cases).
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cal reproductive differences generally is not debated,51 consensus ends
regarding which policies, if any, should be implemented to accommo-
date those differences. 52 Further debate exists as to whether men's
and women's roles as parents differ beyond the context of birth and
breast feeding, and, if so, whether the difference is biologically or
societally imposed.53 There is even further debate as to the existence
and/or extent of physiological and psychological differences between
the sexes. 54
Some scholars reject the "sameness/difference" dichotomy as
based on a comparison with a male norm.55 They suggest "equality as
acceptance"" or equality as elimination of "domination, disadvantage
and disempowerment. 57
51. Some people argue that technology will eliminate the need for human involvement in
reproduction, minimizing the effect of reproductive differences. See Malina Coleman, Gestation,
Intent and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17
Cardozo L. Rev. 497, 499-527 (1996) (discussing the impact of technology on the definition of
motherhood); Alexia E. King, Soloman Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of
Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA Women's L. J. 329 (1995) (same).
52. See, for example, Bender, 57 Fordham L. Rev. at 951 (cited in note 43) (discussing the
difficulty of implementing social policies to "correct" gender differences); Williams, 13 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 326-27 (cited in note 29) (noting the difficulty of implementing policies
according to difference theory); Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination: Toward
Substantive Equality, 10 Wis. Women's L. J. 283, 291-99 (1995) (noting the lack of consensus in
policy implementation).
53. See, for example, Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at 1375 (cited in note 45) (describing topics of
debate); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 70-75 (1995) (discussing the origins of
difference); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.
J. 913, 918-22 (1983) (discussing the social and biological determinations of women's work);
Dowd, 54 Fordham L. Rev. at 699 (cited in note 43) (discussing how biology and society interact
to define women's reality). Contrast Franke, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in this note) with
Kingsley R. Brown, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass
Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1995) (suggesting that biological differences
between the sexes are major factors causing the glass ceiling and gender pay gap).
54. See Rhode, Justice and Gender at 306-15 (cited in note 29); Susan Muller Okin,
Justice, Gender and the Family 6-7 (Basic Books, 1989). For a discussion of the psychological
differences between men and women, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development (Harvard U., 1982); Carol Gilligan, Mapping the Moral
Domain: A Contribution of Women's Thinking to Psychological Theory & Education (Harvard
U., 1989); Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation
(Morrow, 1990). But see Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 802-13
(1989) (claiming that Gilligan's relational feminism is a critique of "possessive individualism"
and not a description of men and women).
55. See, for example, Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1120 (1986) ("Our legal
system ... leaves unquestioned the notion that life patterns and values that are stereotypically
male are the norm."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 12-19 (1987).
56. Littleton, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1284 (cited in note 39). See also Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at
1376 (cited in note 45) (arguing that the legal system should make differences between men and
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All of the theorists, regardless of viewpoint, view women as
important, not marginal and not inferior to men. Many theorists
suggest a restructuring of society, particularly with respect to the
current separation between the workplace and the family.58 United
States v. Virginia can be read as a first step toward that
restructuring.
C. United States v. Virginia Balances Viewpoints Defining Equality
1. Equal Treatment and Results Combined
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pro-
vides, "nor shall any state.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. 59 Thus, a determination of
an equal protection challenge involves finding a state actor and
comparing favored and disfavored classes. In the context of a state-
run military institute, where there is a comparison between men and
women who are capable of completing a harsh curriculum, Justice
Ginsburg appears to combine both the equal treatment and the equal
results models of equal protection analysis.60 While prior Supreme
Court equal protection cases generally have focused on one model or
the other,61 United States v. Virginia brings these two lines of cases
women cause for celebration, not classification); Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 955 (cited in note
31).
57. Catherine MacKinnon, Sexual Harrassment of Working Women 110 (Yale U., 1979);
Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at 1394 (cited in note 45). See also Christina Brooks Whitman, Feminist
Jurisprudence, in Frances E. Olsen, Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations and Outlooks 17 (New
York U., 1995); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market. A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1529-60 (1983) (discussing MacKinnons influence on other
scholars).
58. See, for example, Olsen, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 1499-508 (cited in note 57); Mason, 29 J.
Family L. at 42 (cited in note 42); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and
the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 79, 90-92 (1989); Dowd, 54 Fordham L. Rev. at 699-700 (cited in note 43); Williams, 87
Mich. L. Rev. at 835-36 (cited in note 54); Littleton, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1334 (cited in note 39);
Julie Novkov, Note, A Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconsideration of Parenthood, 19
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 155, 202-03 (1992); Lisa A. Rodensky, Note, California Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra: Preferential Treatment and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 10
Harv. Women's L. J. 225, 250 (1987); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1186-95 (cited in note 28);
Gibson, 73 Va. L. Rev. at 1179-82 (cited in note 28); Rhode, Justice and Gender at 123-25 (cited
in note 29); Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at 1393-99 (cited in note 45); Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change at 352-59 (cited in note 29).
59. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
60. See Part II.B. and specifically note 28.
61. Equal treatment cases include Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding state
estate administration statute that had given automatic preference to males over females having
same relationship to decedent must give men and women equal preference); Stanton v. Stanton,
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together by requiring women to be "capable"62 of undertaking the
rigorous VMI curriculum while simultaneously requiring VMI to
make "alterations" 63 and "adjustments"'64 for "celebrated,"65 inherent
differences between the sexes. These institutional changes enable
VMI to accept capable women. 66 That the differences referred to are
described as "celebrated" indicates not that women are "inferior," but
that the design of an institution built only for men took into account
only one set of characteristics. The alterations cannot be viewed as
"lower standards" because that view would assume that the
institutional design was a "standard" and that any change in the
design would be negative. 67  Rather, one should look at what
421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (holding that state statute providing age of majority must treat men and
women equally); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976) (holding that state statute providing
an age requirement for purchasing 3.2% beer must treat men and women equally); Weinberger
v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (holding that widowers with children are entitled to
equal treatment in statutory scheme that provided benefits to widows with children); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (holding that widowers are entitled to equal treatment in a
statutory scheme providing benefits to widows); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)
(holding that wives are entitled to equal treatment in a statutory scheme giving property
management rights to their husbands); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731 (holding that men are entitled to
enroll in a nursing school with a women-only admissions policy in a state with no nursing school
with a men-only admissions policy); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding
that a peremptory challenge cannot be made by a prosecutor based on gender).
Equal results cases include Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974) (holding that
because widows are more likely to be poor than widowers, a property tax exemption for widows
only was justified); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 505-08 (1975) (holding that fewer
advancement opportunities for women in the military justified more lenient "up or out" policy);
Califano, 430 U.S. at 320 (holding that previous economic discrimination against women
justified a different formula for computing women's and men's social security benefits); Heckler
v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 747-48 (1984) (holding that a widow's reliance on receiving beth
federal pension and social security when widowers received only pension justified five-year
grace period before reducing social security by the amount of the pension).
Some cases, however, do not use either model in upholding discriminatory statutes. See, for
example, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-73 (1981) (holding statutory rape law
applicable only to men was justified because only women become pregnant); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-83 (1981) (holding that draft registration applicable only to men was
justified because women are excluded from combat); Lear v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68
(1983) (upholding different treatment of unmarried mothers and fathers with respect to the
adoption of their children because the parents "are not similarly situated").
62. See Part H.C.2.
63. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2284 n.19.
64. Id. at 2281 n.15.
65. Id. at 2276.
66. Professor Christine Littleton prefers the term "accept" over "accommodate," giving the
example of "accommodating" women by bringing them a box to stand on when using a podium
built for men and "accepting" women by building an adjustable podium. See Littleton, 75 Cal. L.
Rev. at 1314 (cited in note 39).
67. Because Virginia did not have a woman's school with the history, prestige, and
endowment of VMI, the opinion does not address whether two equally high standards, although
separate, would be constitutional. Neither does this Article.
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institutional designs would exist if women had not been historically
discriminated against and what, if any, institutions necessarily would
have to remain for only one sex.68
2. Women Must Be Capable-The Equal Treatment Model of United
States v. Virginia
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes equal treatment throughout her
opinion, particularly in her characterization of one of the two issues
presented in the cross-petitions. She asks: "Does Virginia's exclusion
of women from the educational opportunities provided by
VMI-extraordinary opportunities for military training and civilian
leadership development-deny to women 'capable of all of the individ-
ual activities required of VMI cadets,' the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?"69  She repeats: "The
issue ... is not whether 'women-or men-should be forced to attend
VMI'; rather, the question is whether the State can constitutionally
deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and at-
tendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."70
More than a dozen times she stresses the capability of at least
some women to endure the vigors of VMI. She emphasizes their equal
capability with men in summarizing the parties' stipulations and the
lower courts' findings,71 in rejecting VMI's defenses, 72 and in
discussing the remedy ordering admission33
68. See Catherine L. Fisk, Employer-Provided Child Care Under Title I. Toward an
Employer's Duty to Accommodate Child Care Responsibilities of Employees, 2 Berkeley Women's
L. J. 89, 97 (1986); Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 364 (cited in note 29). See
Part II.B for a discussion of how United States v. Virginia elevates gender equal protection
analysis to the level of strict scrutiny.
69. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth
of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412). The second issue involved the question of remedy: "Second,
if VMrs 'unique' situation-as Virginia's sole single-sex public institution of higher
education-offends the Constitution's equal protection principle, what is the remedial
requirement?" Id. (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 776 F. Supp. at 1413).
70. Id. at 2280 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 F.3d at 93 (Motz,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
71. She states, for example: 'The parties agreed that 'some women can meet the physical
standards now imposed on men....' Id. at 2272 (citing United States v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896) (emphasis omitted). "It is also undisputed, however, that 'the VMI
methodology could be used to educate women.'" Id. at 2279 (citing United States v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 481). "[S]ome women are capable of all of the
individual activities required of VMI cadets." Id. at 2271 (citing United States v. Commonwealth
of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412). "[Tihe [Fourth Circuit] was satisfied that 'neither the goal of
producing citizen soldiers nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to
women."' Id. at 2271 (citing United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899).
She even repeats the same statements: " '[Some women, at least, would want to attend
[VMI] if they had the opportunity,' the district court recognized, and 'some women,' the expert
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One sees the equal treatment model in some of the cases
Justice Ginsburg cites with approval: first J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B.,74 and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan;75 then, Reed v.
Reed,76 Kirchberg v. Feenstra,77 Stanton v. Stanton,78 Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld,79 and Califano v. Goldfarb.80 J.E.B. involved a prosecutor
excluding men from the jury by use of peremptory challenges81 In all
of the other cases a woman or man was barred from doing something
testimony established, 'are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets.'
The parties, furthermore, agree that 'some women can meet the physical standards [VI ] now
imposes on men.' In sum, as the Court of Appeals stated, 'neither the goal of producing citizen
soldiers,' VMl's raison d'6tre, 'nor VMrs implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to
women.'" Id. at 2279 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at
1412, 1414; United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896, 899).
72. She states, for example: "The State's justification for excluding all women from
'citizen-soldier' training for which some are qualified, in any event, cannot rank as 'exceedingly
persuasive,' as we have explained and applied that standard [in equal protection cases]." Id. at
2281. "[The State's great goal is not substantially advanced by women's categorical exclusion,
in total disregard of their individual merit, from the State's premier 'citizen-soldier' corps." Id.
at 2282 (footnote omitted). "[G]eneralizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is
appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description." Id. at 2284.
73. She states, for example: "Virginia was obliged to show that its remedial proposal
'directly address[ed] and related to' the violation, i.e., the equal protection denied to women
ready, willing, and able to benefit from educational opportunities of the kind VMI offers." Id. at
2282-83 (citing Milliken p. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)). She continues:
In contrast to the generalizations about women on which Virginia rests, we note again
these dispositive realities: VMI's implementing methodology is not inherently
unsuitable to women.... Some women, at least, would want to attend [ViMI if they had
the opportunity, some women are capable of all of the individual activities required of
VMI cadets, and can meet the physical standards [VM1] now imposes on men. It is on
behalf of these women that the United States has instituted this suit, and it is for them
that a remedy must be crafted, a remedy that will end their exclusion from a state-
supplied educational opportunity for which they are fit, a decree that will bar like
discrimination in the future.
Id. at 2284 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Virginia's remedy affords no cure
at all for the opportunities and advantages withheld from women who want a VMI education
and can make the grade." Id. at 2286. "Virginia's remedy does not match the constitutional
violation; the State has shown no 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for withholding from
women qualified for the experience premier training of the kind VIE affords." Id. at 2287.
"Women seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be offered anything less...." Id.
"There is no reason to believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required
of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the 'more
perfect Union.'" Id.
74. 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994).
75. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
76. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
77. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
78. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
79. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
80. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
81. 114 S. Ct. at 1421-22.
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or receiving a benefit because of gender. All of the cited cases held
that men and women must be treated equally.8
But United States v. Virginia does not end as those cases do.
They simply decided that the exclusion of women or men was invalid.
United States v. Virginia is more complicated. The remedial aspect of
this case involves admitting women to an institution designed for
men's physical skills and unisex barracks living. The equal treatment
model is insufficient to rectify those aspects of VMI with the simple
remedy, "admit women." That instruction alone would put women in
an impossible position. Many women otherwise capable of meeting
VMI's goals might not be able to perform certain physical
requirements designed for men. They also might resist living in
barracks that provide no privacy protection.
While Justice Ginsburg stresses that the women admitted to
VMI must be of equal talent with the men, it is unclear what this
means. Does it require that women have the same height, weight,
and muscle density as men and have no privacy concerns while nude
and in the presence of nude males? To answer the questions left open
by the equal treatment model, Justice Ginsburg appears to turn to the
equal results model in a carefully limited manner.
3. "Alterations" and "Adjustments"-The Equal Results Model of
United States v. Virginia
While stressing the equal treatment model, United States v.
Virginia does not ignore "inherent differences"83 between men and
women. The opinion, however, does not use those differences to
"denigrate"8 4 women, to view them as inferior, or to deny them equal
opportunities. Rather, the opinion "celebrates"5 differences between
the sexes and requires "alterations"88 in housing arrangements and
"adjustments" T in physical skills requirements to remove opportunity-
limiting barriers. By requiring these limited alterations and
adjustments, United States v. Virginia defines equality by eliminating
gender-based definitions of ability that are made irrelevant by alter-
ing the institution. This definition of equality ensures that an institu-
tion cannot define unnecessarily qualifications in such a way as to
82. For brief descriptions of these cases, see note 61.
83. 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2284 n.19.
87. Id.
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exclude women. For example, VMI cannot define capability as the
ability to tolerate a nude male environment, which would require
women to choose between privacy, safety, and social mores on the one
hand, and equality on the other-a choice not required of the men
currently attending VMI. Requiring VMI to alter and adjust its
physical requirements and housing arrangements provides women
equal results with men: the ability to enter VMI at the same level of
comfort, or discomfort, that the men experience, neither more nor
less. 88
Instead of portraying women as inferior, United States v.
Virginia essentially looks to see how the institution originally would
have been designed to maximize the talents of both genders. Justice
Ginsburg says that the admission of women to VMI should "enhance
its capacity to serve the 'more perfect Union.' "89 In this quotation
Justice Ginsburg speaks of "women capable of all the activities
required of VMI cadets."90 Earlier in the opinion, she speaks of the
necessity of adjusting physical training requirements. 9' While facially
inconsistent, these statements reflect the possibility of removing a
requirement geared to one gender, but unnecessary to the
achievement of the goal of the institution, thus allowing the
admission of qualified people of both genders whose combined
capabilities will enhance the overall goal of the institution.92 The
opinion marks a dramatic departure from the view that if women
want male opportunities, they must look and behave like men to show
that they deserve those opportunities.
The opinion does not return to the protectionism of Muller v.
Oregon,93 in which the Supreme Court justified limiting working
hours for women, but not men, on the general theory that women's
health needed to be protected for the sake of their future children.94
Muller was initially perceived by many as a progressive opinion, per-
88. The current physical program at VE presumably does not require skills for which
women are at an advantage because the program has been designed just for men.
89. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287.
90. Id.
91. Id. at2284n.19.
92. See Part HLI.B for a discussion of how United States v. Virginia elevates gender equal
protection analysis.
93. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
94. Id. at 421-22.
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mitting states to end some of the worst of the sweat shop conditions.95
Some negative consequences of the decision, however, were to limit
the amount of money women could earn and to make employers reluc-
tant to hire them. 96 Later, the Supreme Court affirmed the limitation
of working hours97 and, later still, a minimum wage98 for both men
and women.
Apparently to distinguish Muller, the Court in United States v.
Virginia says, " '[i]nherent differences' between men and women, we
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints
on an individual's opportunity."99  Clarifying what is meant by
"denigration," the opinion instructs that sex-based classifications can
no longer be used "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women,"100 and can no longer be based upon
generalizations.1o01
The opinion uses the language of "accommodation,"102
"adjustment,"103 and "alteration"'14 to describe the required institu-
tional changes. Justice Ginsburg introduces the concept of changing
95. See Mason, 29 J. Family L. at 3-4 (cited in note 42). See also James G. Wilson, The
Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037, 1101-02
(noting that public opinion favored the regulation of the number of hours women could work).
96. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 300 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that nineteenth-century
protective legislation "impeded women in their efforts... in the workplace"). See also Williams,
13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 334 (cited in note 29) (noting that in the 1940s some states
passed, to protect women, mandatory pregnancy leave legislation that did not guarantee
reemployment and therefore" 'protected' pregnant women right out of their jobs"); Judith Olans
Brown, Lucy A. Williams, and Phyllis Trooper Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial
Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA Women's L. J. 457, 467-77 (1996)
(critiquing Muller as accepting a maternal myth that denies other values for women).
97. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917) (upholding an Oregon statute limiting
working hours for both men and women).
98. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (upholding minimum wage for men
and women in Fair Labor Standards Act). The Supreme Court had previously affirmed a
minimum wage only for women, see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99
(1937), having invalidated it thirteen years before in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525, 559 (1923). Deborah Rhode theorizes that protective legislation may have laid the
groundwork for protection for all, but it might also have delayed protection for all. Rhode,
Justice and Gender at 121-22 (cited in note 29). She further argues that legislation for pregnant
women might not have adverse consequences for them in today's political climate and might
lead to benefits for all, but that the best approach is to "push for more by refusing to settle for
less." Id. For the Author's view, see Part IV.C.3.
99. 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
100. Id. (citing with disapproval Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948), a case holding
that differences between men and women justified a state statute passed at the end of World
War II that prohibited most women from tending bar).
101. Id. at 2284.
102. Id. at 2282.
103. Id. at 2281 n.15, 2284 n.19.
104. Id. at 2284 n.19.
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the institution by noting that the parties did not dispute the necessity
of making alterations if women were admitted. She says, "it is un-
contested that women's admission would require accommodations,
primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical training
programs for female cadets."1°s She stresses the equal results model,
saying that VMI's goal
to produce "citizen-soldiers," individuals imbued with love of learning,
confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense
of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise
system, and ready.., to defend their country in time of national peril[,]
[s]urely... is great enough to accommodate women, who today count as
citizens in our American democracy equal in stature to men.10r
Justice Ginsburg details the necessary accommodations in two
footnotes. Footnote fifteen states: "Inclusion of women in settings
where, traditionally, they were not wanted inevitably entails a period
of adjustment."1°7 The "inevitability" of "a period of adjustment" is
elaborated in footnote nineteen:
Admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to
afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements,
and to adjust aspects of the physical training programs. Experience shows
such adjustments are manageable.108
The experience to which Justice Ginsburg refers is the United States
military academies' favorable experience admitting women. 09 The
sentence that contains footnote nineteen uses, in text, the equal
treatment model with the word "fit", and, in footnote, the equal
results model with the words "alterations" and "adjustments." Thus,
the opinion melds both models by requiring women to meet the high
105. Id. at 2279 (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 2281-82 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 2281 n.15.
108. Id. at 2284 n.19 (citations omitted). Footnote nineteen is in the middle of the following
sentence:
It is on behalf of these women that the United States has instituted this suit, and it is
for them that a remedy must be crafted, [footnote nineteen] a remedy that will end their
exclusion from a state-supplied educational opportunity for which they are fit, a decree
that will bar like discrimination in the future.
Id. at 2284.
109. Footnote nineteen cites the note following 10 U.S.C. § 4342: "[A]cademic and other
standards for women admitted to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies 'shall be the
same as those required for male individuals, except for those minimum essential adjustments in
such standards required because of physiological differences between male and female
individuals.'" United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2284 n.19.
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standards of the institution, and by requiring the institution to alter
and adjust in order to accept the "celebrated" inherent differences
between the genders.
One also sees melding of the models in United States v.
Virginia's citations, not only to the equal treatment cases described
above, but also to two equal results cases: Califano v. Webster10 and
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.", In both
of those cases the Court upheld statutes containing gender
classifications. Webster upheld a statute that permitted different
computation of social security benefits for men and women to compen-
sate women for economic disabilities.12  Guerra upheld, against a
Title VII preemption challenge, a state statute requiring employers to
give employees unpaid pregnancy leave."l 3 In combining equal results
and equal treatment in one opinion, United States v. Virginia goes
beyond existing precedent to formulate a new approach to gender
equal protection analysis. 114
III. ELEVATION OF GENDER EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A. Constitutionally Mandated Accommodations
for "Celebrated" Differences
After holding that VMI violated equal protection in its
admissions policies, Justice Ginsburg goes further than either the
equal treatment or equal results cases that she cites. None of the
equal treatment cases required governments to make institutional
alterations. None of the equal results cases, such as the differential
social security accounting system, the pregnancy leave statute, or the
military academies' admission of women, had been instituted
110. 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
111. 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
112. 430 U.S. at 320.
113. 479 U.S. at 289-90.
114. In a law review article written in 1978, then Professor Ginsburg discussed the limits of
a "genuinely compensatory classification" which "directly addresses discrimination and serves to
remedy it." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Content of
Sex, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 813, 823 (1978). She states: "Webster thus attempts to preserve and to
bolster a general rule of equal treatment while leaving a corridor for genuinely compensatory
classification." Id. She also describes "childbearing capacity," saying, "[i]f benign sex
classification ever had a place, it is in this area." Id. at 825.
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pursuant to court order. These were all legislative creations." 5
United States v. Virginia, however, not only requires VMI to admit
capable women, but also requires that it make institutional changes
to accept them.116 Why did six of the eight justices hearing this case
go this far? Presumably because, in the logical progression of equal
protection case law, the cases have reached a stage of complexity
where equal treatment analysis or equal results analysis alone will
not achieve the equality mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Mandating Institutional Alterations Requires Least-Restrictive-
Means Analysis
1. History of Gender Equal Protection Analysis
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court dismissed women's claims of
unequal treatment on the ground that women are different from men.
In particular, the VMI case cites with disapproval Goesaert v.
Cleary,"11 a case that noted that while the discrimination challenge
was "beguiling,"" 8 the purported differences between men and women
justified a state statute passed after World War II prohibiting most
women from working as bartenders."m
In 1971 a legal sea change in gender equal protection cases
occurred. In Reed v. Reed, °20 a unanimous Court refused to dismiss a
woman's claim of unequal treatment because of her sex. The Court
chose not to follow the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning that men
115. Justice Scalia notes that the federal military colleges admitted women "because the
people, through their elected representatives, decreed a change." United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
116. This remedy assumed that VMI would remain a state institution. After investigating
the possibility of one of the remedial options suggested by the Fourth Circuit, abandoning state
support, VMI decided to remain a state-supported institution and admit women. Donald Baker,
By One Vote, V1AH Decides to Go Coed; Nation's Last All-Male Military School to Enroll Women
Starting in '97, Wash. Post Al (Sept. 22, 1996); Wes Allison, First Female Rats to Have Mentors:
Older Women Advisers to Be Part of VMI Corps, Richmond-Times Dispatch (Sept. 9, 1997).
117. 335 U.S. 464 (1948), cited in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276. Justice
Scalia cites Goesaert with approval in his dissent. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2296
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. 335 U.S. at 464.
119. Id. at 466-67.
120. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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were more likely than women to have business experience 21 and held
that a state statute preferring men over women in the administration
of decedents' estates violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 12  By 1976,
the Court had articulated a "midtier analysis" for gender equal pro-
tection cases. 123 That analysis requires a state to justify classification
by gender with a showing that the classification is "substantially re-
lated" to the achievement of "important governmental objectives."124
The "midtier test" contrasts with "rational basis" equal protection
analysis and "strict scrutiny" analysis for race and fundamental
rights cases. Under rational basis analysis, a classification must ra-
tionally relate to some legitimate governmental purpose. 25 Under
strict scrutiny, a government may classify individuals only upon a
showing that there is no less discriminatory means available to
achieve an essential or compelling purpose. Stated differently, a
government must show that the classification is necessary to achieve
that purpose. 26
Since 1971, the Court has invalidated many state and federal
policies that treat men and women differently, but has occasionally
upheld differential treatment to remedy past discrimination.17 Some
cases, however, continue to resemble those decided before 1971,
upholding, because of physical differences between men and women,
differential treatment, even though such treatment was not designed
to create equal results.128 This confusing conglomeration of "midtier"
121. The rationale given by the state, and accepted by the Idaho Supreme Court, that men
are "better qualified," see 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970), was not mentioned by the
Supreme Court in Reed, but was in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
122. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
123. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
124. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting
Craig and citing other cases that use the midtier articulation).
125. Under rational basis equal protection review, the burden is usually on the challenging
party to prove that a classification is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Only if the application of a law is totally arbitrary, serving no legitimate government interest,
will it fail under this deferential test. See, for example, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (upholding as rational a state law requiring the retirement
of police officers over fifty years old).
126. The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny equal protection review when the
government intentionally acts on the basis of a suspect classification such as race, see, for
example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33
(1984), or national origin, see, for example, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954), or acts
to infringe some "fundamental rights," see, for example, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978) (right to marry); Shapiro p. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to interstate
travel).
127. See equal treatment and equal results cases cited in note 61.
128. See cases employing neither model cited in note 61.
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equal protection cases has evoked criticism from commentators 129 and
from the justices themselves.130  United States v. Virginia's
requirement of accommodation adds a new dimension to these cases,
which may serve to unify the analysis.
2. Application of Equal Protection Analysis in United States v.
Virginia
a. Description of Traditional Analysis
The summary of gender equal protection law in the majority
opinion begins with a familiar review. It quotes from prior fourteenth
amendment case law stating that a court must determine that the
justification for differential treatment is "exceedingly persuasive."131
The majority opinion cites prior equal treatment cases to point out
that the state has the burden of proving that justification,132 which
must be genuine and cannot rely on overbroad generalizations.133
The Court quotes the midtier test: "The State must show at
least that the [challenged] classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
129. See, for example, Johnny C. Parker, Equal Protection Minus Strict Scrutiny Plus
Benign Classification Equals What? Equality of Opportunity, 11 Pace L. Rev. 213, 225-26 (1991)
(noting the "growing judicial disenchantment" with the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence).
130. See, for example, Craig, 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that "the
two-tiered analysis" is not "a completely logical method of deciding cases"); id. at 210 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (asserting "there are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the 'two-tier'
approach.... I would not welcome a further subdividing of equal protection analysis"); id. at
220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that "we have had enough difficulty with the two
standards of review... so as to counsel weightily against the insertion of still another 'standard'
between those two"). See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-42
(1985) (Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that levels of review are not a
useful method of analysis but that the characteristics of groups may be "irrelevant to a valid
public purpose," making the classification irrational); Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of
Philadelphia, 400 F. Supp. 326, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (stating that the Supreme Court's
guidance in equal protection cases is like a shell game in which the players are "not absolutely
sure there is a pea"), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430
U.S. 703 (1977).
131. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275. Chief Justice Rehnquist in concurrence
and Justice Scalia in dissent note that the majority opinion uses this phrase nine times. Id. at
2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2275 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
133. Id. (citing Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643, 648; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 223-24 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
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are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.""34
The inclusion of the phrase "at least" is a signal that this opinion may
be going beyond that test.35 Justice Scalia points out another signal,
noting Justice Ginsburg's comment that "[tihe Court has thus far
reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on
race or national origin .... ,"136 Justice Scalia argues that, contrary to
its language, the majority opinion uses the "least-restrictive-means
analysis."1 37 Thus, he says the majority's "statements ... are
calculated to destabilize current law."' 38  But the criticisms of the
midtier test indicate that the test has hardly created stability or
predictability in litigation."39
Although Justice Ginsburg's use of the phrase "exceedingly
persuasive" derives from prior equal protection cases, both Chief
Justice Rehnquist 140 and Justice Scalia'4 claim that she uses the
phrase in a different context. They claim that she has elevated the
midtier test when she says: "[W]e conclude that Virginia has shown
no 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for excluding all women from
the citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI."142 An examination of
how the majority rejects Virginia's defenses and orders a remedy
indicates that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia probably are
correct.
b. Rejection of Virginia's Defenses
Virginia first defended on the grounds that single-sex educa-
tion was important and offered diversity. Second, Virginia argued
that admitting women to VMI would require modification of the
adversative method.'4' Trying to fit these claims into the articulated
midtier rationale shows its clumsiness. Providing diversity in
education is clearly important. The problem, however, is that there is
no explanation for why the classification must be based on gender. In
134. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
135. The same phrase is also used in Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
136. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
Justice Scalia's dissent). See id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
139. See notes 129-30.
140. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
141. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2276.
143. Id. (citation omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist describes the same defenses, noting
that Virginia sought to "justify" its male-only admissions policy with two defenses: "diversity in
education," id. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), and "maintenance of the adversative
method," id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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fact, besides holding that the evidence is insufficient to show that
diversity in education was Virginia's "true reason" for the differential
treatment,'" the majority rejects the "diversity" defense because it
does not explain why diversity was provided only to its "sons" and not
to its "daughters."145
Thus, whether a male-only (or female-only) admissions policy
is closely related to diversity in education does not seem to be the
proper question. The proper question is why single-sex diversity
should be provided by the state only for men, or conversely, as Justice
Ginsburg frames the question, why women must be excluded from the
unique citizen-soldier program. 1' That raises a related question:
does the reason for excluding women need to be rational, important,
or essential? Since 1971 the Court has made clear that the reason
must be more than rational. 47 Twenty-five years later the phrase
Justice Ginsburg uses is "exceedingly persuasive."'" Does
"exceedingly pervasive" mean important or essential?
The Court's resolution of Virginia's second defense would indi-
cate that a state's reason for excluding women must be essential, not
merely important. Virginia's second defense, as quoted by the
Supreme Court, is that" 'the unique VMI method of character devel-
144. Id. at 2277. Agreeing with the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejects the defense
on the ground that there is "scant evidence in the record that [diversity] was the real reason
that Virginia decided to maintain VMI as men only." Id. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(footnote omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to depart from his earlier opinions in
agreeing that the "real reason" for the government's differential policy is an element of midtier
analysis. His opinion for the Court in Michael M. did not appear to give that "real reason" much
importance. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that states had
only recently asserted that statutory rape laws were justified as a means to protect against
pregnancy).
145. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279. Justice Scalia argues that Virginia is not
discriminating against its daughters because it provides state support to private women's
colleges. Id. at 2297, 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist responds to Justice
Scalia's approach by saying that Virginia supports all private schools in the same manner; it
"gives no special support to ... women's single-sex education." Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
146. Justice Ginsburg says: "[D]oes... exclusion of women from... VM... deny to
women... equal protection... T' Id. at 2274 (emphasis added). "Measuring the record in this
case against the review standard .... we conclude that Virginia has shown no 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by
VMI." Id. at 2276 (emphasis added). This formulation of the issue was first articulated in 1981
in Rostker by Justice Marshall, see Rostker, 453 U.S. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('The
government's task.., is to demonstrate that excluding women... substantially furthers the
goal...." (emphasis added)), and was restated one year later in Hogan by Justice O'Connor, see
458 U.S. at 731 (emphasis added) C[Tihe record is flatly inconsistent with the claim that
excluding men... is necessary to reach any ofsMUWs... goals.").
147. See Part lI.B.1.
148. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2281, 2282, 2287.
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opment and leadership training,' the school's adversative approach,
would have to be modified were VMI to admit women.' 149 Virginia
argued that the modification would "destroy" VMI's program. 150
Applying that defense to the midtier test, one could either ask
whether the adversative method is closely related to diversity of
education or whether the adversative method is an important gov-
ernmental interest and whether the differential treatment is closely
related to that interest. The first approach does not explain the dif-
ferential treatment. The second approach could explain it, but the
majority, unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, does not reach the issue
whether the method is important. Chief Justice Rehnquist sees no
support in the record for a finding that the adversative method, as
opposed to single sex education generally,151 has pedogogical value.152
149. Id. at 2276 (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 33-36, United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996)) (available on LEXIS, GENFED library, BRIEFS file).
150. Id. at 2279 (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 34-36, United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996)) (available on LEXIS, GENFED library, BRIEFS file). The
Court summarized the district court's findings after the first trial, saying:.
Women are [indeed] denied a unique educational opportunity that is available only at
VMI.... But [VMI's] single-sex status would be lost, and some aspects of the [school's]
distinctive method would be altered if women were admitted: Allowance for personal
privacy would have to be made; [p]hysical education requirements would have to be
altered, at least for the women; the adversative environment could not survive
unmodified.
Id. at 2271 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court also quoted the district
courts finding that "[tihe most important aspects of the VMI educational experience occur in the
barracks." Id. at 2283 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at
1423). The Court said further: "The District Court forecast from expert witness testimony, and
the Court of Appeals accepted, that coeducation would materially affect 'at least these three
aspects of VMI's program-physical training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative
approach."' Id. at 2279 (quoting United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896-
97).
Justice Scalia says the findings of fact indicate that "Virginia's options were an adversative
method that excludes women or no adversative method at all." ' Id. at 2297 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
For commentators agreeing that changes to accommodate women would destroy VMI, see
Caplice, 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 274 (cited in note 13); Soderberg, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
at 17 (cited in note 13); Yablonski, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. at 1470 (cited in note 13). For
commentators who supported admitting women to state-run military institutions, see Mary M.
Cheh, An Essay on VMT and Military Servica Yes, We Do Have to Be Equal Together, 50 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 49 (1993); Laurie A. Keco, Note, The Citadel: Last Male Bastion or New Training
Ground?, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 479 (1996); Julie M. Arnstein, Note, United States v. Virginia:
The Case of Coeducation at Virginia Military Institute, 3 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 69 (1994);
Marcia Berman, An Equal Protection Analysis of Public and Private All-Male Military Schools,
1991 U. Chi. Legal Forum 211.
151. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2290-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). As
noted in the introduction to this Article, see note 7, the Court, in a footnote, appears to leave
unresolved the general issue of the constitutionality of single-sex education in circumstances
other than VMI's. Id. at 2276 n.7.
152. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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The majority holds that the relationship, whether close or
essential, between the exclusion of women and the successful applica-
tion of the adversative method is unproven. The Court notes that
Virginia failed to prove its second defense because its witnesses
conceded that some women could do well under the adversative
method, and because the remaining evidence was based on
stereotypes and overbroad generalizations.1 3 The Court says that
"[t]he notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI's
stature, destroy the adversative system and with it, even the school,
is a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other
'self-fulfilling prophec[ies]...."'154 The opinion discusses other
situations in which catastrophic consequences have been predicted,
but not materialized, from the inclusion of women, most notably in
their admission to the legal and medical professions155 and to the
police and military academies and professions.156 The remedy that the
Court implies would be appropriate is for VMI to admit women who
are fit and make the same or similar institutional changes as the
military academies made when they admitted women. 157
c. Strict Scrutiny
By ordering a remedy for "some women" the Court is using, as
Justice Scalia contends, a "least-restrictive-means analysis,"158 hold-
153. Id. at 2279-82. Chief Justice Rehnquist believes the majority did reach the issue. He
explains:
I agree with the Court that [maintenance of the adversative method] does not serve an
important governmental objective. A State does not have substantial interest in the
adversative methodology unless it is pedagogically beneficial. While considerable
evidence shows that a single-sex education is pedagogically beneficial for some
students .... there is no similar evidence in the record that an adversative method is
pedagogically beneficial or is any more likely to produce character traits than other
methodologies.
Id. at 2290-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
766 F. Supp. at 1414).
154. Id. at 2280 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730) (footnotes omitted). Justice Scalia claimed
that the majority ignored findings of fact that women have different educational needs from
those of men. Id. at 2291, 2296-98, 2300-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2280-81.
156. Id. at 2281.
157. Id. at 2282-87. Chief Justice Rehnquist would have required a different remedy.
Rather than remanding to order the admission of women to VMI, he would accept as a remedy
"a demonstration by Virginia that its interest in educating men in a single-sex environment is
matched by its interest in educating women in a single-sex institution." Id. at 2291 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). He would not require "the creation of a VMI clone," nor would he condone the
creation of a women's school based on stereotypes. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ing that VMI can achieve its purpose in a manner less restrictive than
excluding all women. The remedy goes further, however, than order-
ing "some women" to be admitted to VMI. The remedy does not re-
quire "some women" to benefit from the program as it is, with, among
other things, total lack of privacy. The remedy, as discussed above,159
requires alterations in housing and adjustments in physical skill re-
quirements. Justice Scalia objects to this: "There should be no debate
in the federal judiciary over 'how much' VMI would be required to
change if it admitted women and whether that would constitute 'too
much' change."16O He is correct that requiring a remedy for "some
women" and requiring institutional changes leaves discretion with the
factfinder to determine which inherent differences justify institutional
change, and for what subset of women the changes are to be made.
The more alterations that are made in an institution originally geared
toward gender-specific traits, however, the more likely that greater
numbers of the other sex will attend. The problem with requiring no
institutional alteration is that unnecessary inequality based on
inherent differences will remain.
United States v. Virginia uses the language of necessity in
stressing the limited nature of the alterations. In the footnote dis-
cussing the required institutional alterations, Justice Ginsburg states
that "[a]dmitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require altera-
tions necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other
sex in living arrangements ... "161 She quotes from legislation
mandating that the military academies treat men and women the
same "except for those minimum essential adjustments in such stan-
dards required because of physiological differences between male and
female individuals."162
By ordering changes to be made, the Court recognizes that
there is an essential, but unnecessary, relationship between gender
and the adversative method. If the relationship were not essential, no
change would be necessary upon the inclusion of women. If the rela-
tionship between gender and adversative method were necessary, no
change would be ordered and no women would be admitted, unless
the adversative method itself were unnecessary. Thus, United States
v. Virginia appears to use, but not articulate, a strict scrutiny analy-
sis. An essential connection between differential gender treatment
159. See Part II.C.3.
160. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2284 n.19.
162. Id. (quoting note following 10 U.S.C. § 4342). See also note 109 and accompanying
text.
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and a governmental purpose does not justify the treatment, but sup-
ports the need to consider altering the purpose. Only a purpose that
cannot change, for which differential treatment is necessary, would
now appear to survive equal protection gender scrutiny. Thus, the
availability of institutional alterations as a remedy affects the
necessity of excluding women. While looking to the availability of a
remedy to determine liability appears to be a new method of analysis,
it is, in fact, what the least restrictive means test has always done. It
requires an examination of whether there is another means of
achieving the same result. Noting that there is another means
available is a recognition that a remedy could be ordered to
implement that new means. By ordering change, or considering
whether an institution can make changes to achieve its purpose in a
less restrictive way, United States v. Virginia resembles both Title VII
and strict scrutiny equal protection cases.
C. United States v. Virginia's Least-Restrictive-Means Analysis
Resembles Title VIIAnalysis
1. Title VII's Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense to
Intentional Discrimination
Under Title VII, an employer who intentionally discriminates
on the basis of sex can defend on the ground that a gender qualifica-
tion is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."163
This is known as the "BFOQ" defense. Courts have held that the
defense is narrow164 and that the job qualification must relate to the
"essence" of the business. 65
Additionally, a job qualification can be gender-based only if an
employer can prove that all or substantially all members of the
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
164. See, for example, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
165. See Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991); id. at 206
(concluding that protection of future children from lead exposure is not an essential aspect of
the job or business of making batteries); id. at 207 (finding that employer failed to show that all
women would be unable to perform the duties of the job safely and efficiently); Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that being female was
not a BFOQ for job as flight attendant because being "soothing" is not reasonably necessary to
the normal operations of the particular business).
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excluded gender cannot do the work. 16 In some instances, a court
requires employers to do a case by case screening designed to avoid
the rejection of all women based on stereotypes of what substantially
all women are thought to be unable to do.167 If, on the other hand, the
employer has job requirements that, while neutrally phrased, would
eliminate a disproportionate number of one gender or the other, then
under disparate impact analysis, the employer could be ordered to
discontinue the practice, or otherwise accommodate the excluded
gender.
2. Disparate Impact Claims Under Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause
Disparate impact and disparate treatment are two well-recog-
nized types of discrimination claims. Disparate treatment involves
intentional discrimination against someone because of race, sex, or
some other forbidden factor. 68 The Constitution prohibits disparate
treatment discrimination by the government, 169 while Title VII prohib-
its such conduct by a private or public employer.170
Disparate impact discrimination involves a facially neutral
practice that causes a disproportionate and adverse impact upon a
protected class of people, here women.' 71 In Title VII litigation, where
the employer's neutral practice causes the disparate impact, no
showing of intent to discriminate is necessary for liability.7 2 In equal
protection litigation, however, intent to discriminate must be proven.
In the one equal protection disparate impact gender case to reach the
Supreme Court, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 73 the Court imposed the requirement of intentional
discrimination found in racial disparate impact equal protection
166. See, for example, Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235 (5th Cir. 1969).
167. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1971).
168. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
169. U.S. Const., Amend. V, Amend. XIV, § 1.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
171. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
172. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Griggs was reinterpreted by Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659.60 (1989) (holding intent required in Title VII disparate impact cases).
Wards Cove was then legislatively overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
2(k) (providing that intent is not required in disparate impact cases).
173. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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cases.' 74 Thus, the plaintiff in Feeney had to prove, which she could
not, that Massachusetts instituted veterans' preferences in state em-
ployment in order to exclude women. A showing that the veterans'
preferences had that effect, or that Massachusetts could foresee that
effect, was insufficient for liability.'75
In a Title VII case, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie dis-
parate impact case, a defendant can defend by proving that the neu-
tral practice is a "business necessity."' 76 If the defendant is able to
establish the defense, the plaintiff still has an opportunity to prove
that the defendant could achieve the business necessity in a less dis-
criminatory way.'17
3. BFOQ and Disparate Impact Analysis Applied to the Facts of
United States v. Virginia
Although VMI is not an "employer" with respect to its students
for Title VII purposes, application of Title VII's BFOQ defense and
disparate impact analysis to United States v. Virginia's facts illus-
trates the similarity between these analyses and the case's least-re-
strictive-means analysis. The VMI case involves governmental dispa-
rate treatment based on gender because the Commonwealth of
Virginia intentionally treated women differently from men by
excluding them from a military college. In fact, the VMI case involves
facial discrimination because VMI did not deny the discrimination: it
had an explicit all-male admissions policy. When VMI argued that
accommodating women would destroy its adversative method, 78 its
attempted defense resembled a BFOQ defense in that it was arguing
the "necessity" of not destroying a method that was "essential" to its
institutional identity. The Court held that VMI had not met its
burden of proving the defense because "some women" could benefit
from the adversative program and because the projected negative
174. Id. at 272. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
175. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277. For an interesting thesis that gender equality permits a state
to enact preferences with a negative disparate impact on women, such as in Feeney, so long as
the state also enacts a "complementary" preference with a positive disproportionate impact on
women, see Littleton, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1324-32 (cited in note 39).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975).
178. See note 150.
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consequences were speculative and based on stereotypes. 1 9 Both of
these points are found in Title VII BFOQ cases. 180 Both create a
defense difficult for the defendant to meet.
Although the VMI case is one of disparate treatment, it also
addresses disparate impact discrimination. The decision requires not
only that VMI admit women who are fit, but also that VMI make
institutional changes in barracks living and physical skill require-
ments to provide equal opportunity to women. 181 A remedy could have
been fashioned that said, "all women willing to live without privacy in
the military style barracks and able to perform feats of great upper
body strength may apply." If the Court had ordered VMI to admit
women without changing any of its practices, however, those practices
could have been labeled neutral practices having a disparate impact
on women. The practices would be neutral because they contain no
explicit statement about women. They would cause a disparate
impact upon women because few women would want to live without
physical privacy from men, and fewer women than men have great
upper body strength.
If women claimed that unchanged barracks practices and
physical skill requirements had a disparate impact upon them, in the
context of Title VII litigation, this showing would be sufficient to
make the plaintiffs' prima facie case. The plaintiffs would not need to
show that the practices were instituted with the intent of excluding
women. VMI would need to defend by showing that the practices
were necessary to its "business," and plaintiffs still would be entitled
to show that there are less discriminatory ways to achieve the needs
of that "business." Again, this is similar to how VMI defended against
the equal protection claims. 182 VMI argued that it provided diversity
in education and that its unaltered adversative method was necessary
for its institutional identity. By ordering institutional alterations,
however, the Court acknowledged the stringent requirements for such
a defense and implicitly accepted the United States' argument that
there are less restrictive means to achieve VMI's purposes. 183
Diversity at the expense of Virginia's "daughters" was too
restrictive. 84  Creating a parallel institution at this date was
179. See Part III.B.2.b.
180. See notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
181. See Part I.C.3.
182. See Part III.B.2.b.
183. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2279.
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ineffective.185 Dismantling VMI was unnecessary. Necessary and
minimal alterations, however, can maintain VMI's purpose for both
men and women.
United States v. Virginia obviously is not a Title VII case: it is
a constitutional case that requires proof that the neutral practices
were instituted intentionally to discriminate against women.18 6 In the
VMI case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a finding by the district court
that the adversative method "was not designed to exclude women,1 87
but had independent pedagogical value. 188 Without any court having
found a contrary intent, however, the Supreme Court effectively re-
quired VMI, which intentionally discriminated against women, to
"alter" and "adjust" ostensibly neutral housing arrangements and
physical skill requirements to "accommodate" women. 89 Thus, United
States v. Virginia requires a state actor that has intentionally
discriminated against women to make institutional alterations with-
out requiring that women prove that the practices to be altered were
implemented intentionally by the defendant to exclude women. The
defendant's policy of intentional discrimination appears to supply the
requisite intent for a court to require alteration or elimination of
neutral practices within a discriminatory framework.190 This
elimination of the requirement of intentional discrimination for neu-
tral practices within a discriminatory institution changes a key aspect
185. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist would permit the creation of a separate but
comparable women's school, see id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), he also noted VMIs
150 year history, and concluded that "[n]o legislative wand could instantly call into existence a
similar institution for women," id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
186. See Part 11I.C.2.
187. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1239.
188. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1426, 1434. With respect
to the adversative method, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded there was no evidence that the
adversative method was pedagogically beneficial. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2291(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia disagreed. Id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion did not address that issue. See also notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
189. United States v. Virginia, 166 S. Ct. at 2281 n.15, 2284 n.19.
190. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989). In Price Waterhouse,
the Court held that a finding that an employer intentionally discriminated against a woman
justifies shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove it would not have promoted
her even had there been no discrimination, even though there was also a finding that the
employer had legitimate reasons for not promoting the woman. Id. See also Candace S.
Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics
as Substance, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 615, 641-43 (1990) (explaining that Price Waterhouses analysis
is consistent with established evidentiary rules for shifting burdens of proof). In intentional
racial discrimination cases, such as school desegration cases, the Court has also affirmed
ordering changes in neutral practices such as transportation to school. See Swann v. Charlotte
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
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of constitutional disparate impact gender equal protection analysis
and makes it similar to Title VII disparate impact analysis. 191
The defenses for Title VII disparate treatment and disparate
impact cases, with their use of the words "necessary" and "essential,"
resemble the defense to strict scrutiny equal protection claims. To
put this in familiar constitutional language, for a discriminatory
practice to remain, a government must show that the practice is
"narrowly tailored," and that no less discriminatory means will
achieve the purpose.192 Although United States v. Virginia is neither a
Title VII nor equal protection race case, its articulation of the level of
scrutiny does not use "midtier" language. Rather, United States v.
Virginia relies on strict scrutiny cases in discussing the remedy.
D. United States v. Virginia's Use of Race Cases Is Consistent with
Heightened Scrutiny
The language of "accommodation," "adjustment," and
"alteration" in United States v. Virginia is extraordinary. 193 Prior to
this case, no gender equal protection case had required the defendant
to make institutional alterations. Such alterations have been ordered
to achieve equal protection in race cases. 194
Not only is United States v. Virginia the first gender equal
protection case to order institutional alterations, but it is also the first
to rely upon equal protection remedial race cases, specifically Milliken
v. Bradley'95 and Louisiana v. United States. 96 In Milliken, the Court
upheld court-ordered remedies requiring a variety of institutional
changes, including remedial education, counseling, and teacher
training, to end unconstitutional racial segregation in public
schools.197 In Louisiana v. United States, the Court upheld a decree to
remedy unconstitutional voting procedures that included monthly
191. Whether this change would apply to race is beyond the scope of this Article. This
change in analysis would have affected Feeney by permitting an inquiry into whether there was
intentional discrimination in the state employment system, not just in the veteran's preference
policy. See notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
192. See note 125 and accompanying text.
193. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2281 n.15, 2282, 2284 n.19.
194. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 29-31 (authorizing the transportation of students as a means
to desegregate schools); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 500 (1954) (holding that
separate educational facilities are "inherently unequar); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 458-59 (1979) (ordering the dismantling of the dual system of racially segregated
schools); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538-41 (1979) (same).
195. 433 U.S. 267 (1977), cited in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282.
196. 380 U.S. 145 (1965), cited in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282.
197. 433 U.S. at 272, 288.
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reporting to the district court and postponing implementation of a
neutrally imposed citizenship test.198 Because the remedy in race
cases follows a finding of liability under strict scrutiny analysis,
reliance upon these cases for remedial analysis is consistent with
United States v. Virginia's implicit use of strict scrutiny analysis to
determine liability.
Although Justice Ginsburg relies upon remedial race cases, she
is also aware that the assumptions in race and gender cases differ. In
distinguishing cases involving race from those involving gender,
Justice Ginsburg states: "Supposed 'inherent differences' are no
longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications.
Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring:
'[Tihe two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of
one [sex] is different from a community composed of both.' "199 The
differences between race and gender equal protection cases are
accounted for in the purpose behind requiring institutional
alterations. Alterations are ordered in racial cases to correct past
inequities and to remove intransigence in the implementation of
assimilation.20 Alterations are ordered in gender cases to facilitate
equality between people with biological differences. In both types of
cases, however, the availability of institutional alterations is a
recognition that only necessary differential treatment is permissible.
If there is a less discriminatory way in which the institution can
achieve its result, then unequal treatment is unnecessary. This is
strict scrutiny analysis.
The two race cases are cited in United States v. Virginia for the
proposition that "[a] remedial decree.., must closely fit the constitu-
tional violation; it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally
denied an opportunity or advantage in 'the position they would have
occupied in the absence of [discrimination].' "201 While United States
v. Virginia refers to the race cases as requiring a remedy to be for-
mulated that has a "close fit" with the constitutional violation, reme-
dies in prior gender discrimination cases invalidating differential
treatment have had not just a close fit, but an exact one: the courts
have ordered, or remanded for an order, that the excluded gender be
198. 380 U.S. at 155-56.
199. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
200. See cases cited in note 194.
201. 116 S. Ct. at 2282 (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280).
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included, or the included gender be excluded. 2 2 Thus, the prior gen-
der cases that have rejected stereotypical justifications for differential
treatment did not need to discuss the possibility of institutional
change to achieve equal treatment; they merely eliminated gender
requirements from the statutes, permitting both sexes to be treated
equally. Those cases, however, did not involve physiological
differences between the sexes.20 3
Prior gender cases involving physiological differences upheld
differential treatment, even when the discrimination was not
intended to rectify past discrimination.204 Those cases did not discuss
whether alterations could be made to provide equal treatment; they
justified the classifications by focusing, among other things, on physi-
ological differences between men and women. For example, in
Rostker v. Goldberg,2 5 the Court upheld a male-only draft registration
system on the ground that men and women were not "similarly
situated"206 because women were statutorily excluded from combat.
The combat exclusion was based, at least in part, on physiological
differences. 207
United States v. Virginia is more complicated than the
decisions in prior gender equal protection cases. It is the first case to
reject differential treatment based on physiological differences
between the genders. It does so by ordering institutional alterations.
The alteration requirement is a recognition that when an institution
is designed specifically for men, its design may reflect their
physiological characteristics. If the design were unmodifiable, it
would perpetuate the exclusion of women. Requiring "alterations"
and "adjustments" recognizes that "physiological differences" between
men and women do not necessarily defeat equal treatment. This
recognition adds a new level to gender equal protection analysis:
consideration of whether a government can and should make altera-
tions or adjustments before a court decides that inequality is permis-
sible.
This new level of analysis for gender equal protection cases
casts doubt on the continuing validity of prior cases upholding
differential treatment not designed to "celebrate" inherent differences
202. For a description of remedies ordered in gender equal protection cases, see note 61.
203. For a description of the types of gender differences used in statutory classifications,
see note 61.
204. Freedman, 92 Yale L. J. at 913 (cited in note 53) (describing the different types of
equal protection gender cases).
205. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
206. Id. at 78.
207. Id. at 81.
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or remedy past discrimination. 208 It is possible that the "not similarly
situated '20 analysis found in those cases to justify differential
treatment can no longer end the analysis. Courts will need to
consider whether the government can make "alterations" or
"adjustments" to eliminate the significance of the inherent differences
between the sexes. Most notably, Rostker probably would be decided
differently and according to Justice Marshall's dissent.210 Justice
Marshall criticized the majority's analysis, articulating the same
focus for analysis2 1 later raised by Justice O'Connor in Hogan,212 and
Justice Ginsburg in United States v. Virginia:2 13  Why should one
gender be excluded at all? Justice Marshall would have concluded
that, with some alterations to the system of allocating draftees in the
military, some women could be accepted in the military via the
draft.214
To summarize, by requiring VMI to make institutional adjust-
ments to admit qualified women, the Court has elevated equal
protection analysis to the level of the least-restrictive-means analysis
of strict scrutiny. By rejecting as unproven VMIs assertion that ad-
mission of women would destroy the institution, the Court has clearly
placed the burden of proof upon the party seeking to uphold a statute
that classifies by gender. From now on, courts faced with gender
equal protection challenges will need to consider whether institutions
can make changes, even in practices not intentionally discriminatory,
before ruling that the exclusion of one or the other gender is
permissible.
208. See note 61 (citing Michael M, and Rostker as examples of Supreme Court cases that
upheld differential treatment for men and women on grounds of physical differences).
209. See, for example, Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78-89; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469.
210. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 86-113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 94 ("[TIhe Governmenes task... is to demonstrate that excluding
women... substantially furthers the goal... (emphasis added)) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. 458 U.S. at 731 ('The second is... inconsistent with the claim that excluding
men... is necessary.. . ." (emphasis added)).
213. 116 S. Ct. at 2274 ("[D]oes... exclusion of women from... VMI... deny to
women.., equal protection... ?' (emphasis added)). See also note 146 and accompanying text.
214. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 112.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA'S ANALYSIS APPLIES TO
CONSTITUTIONAL AND TITLE VII PREGNANCY CASES
A. United States v. Virginia Changes Constitutional Pregnancy
Discrimination Analysis
1. History of Pregnancy Litigation
United States v. Virginia is significant not only because it
raises gender equal protection analysis to the level of strict scrutiny,
but also because it appears to include pregnancy in that analysis.
Justice Ginsburg cites California Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Guerra215 in her summary of equal protection law. Guerra is a Title
VII pregnancy leave case. While Title VII's main focus is on
prohibiting employers from discriminating "because of sex" or other
characteristics, 216 the issue in Guerra was whether a state statute
requiring employers to provide unpaid pregnancy leave was
preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), 217 an
amendment to Title VII. The PDA, codified as section 701 of Title VII,
provides:
Mhe terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of se" include... because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work.218
The employer in Guerra argued that the state pregnancy leave statute
did not treat women "the same ... as other persons.., similar in
their... inability to work" because it did not require the employer to
give leave to anyone except pregnant workers. 219 The employer sought
to have the California leave act invalidated on this ground.220
215. 479 U.S. 272 (1987), cited in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
216. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer [to take described negative employment actions against an individual] because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
217. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 283-84.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
219. 479 U.S. at 277-79 & n.6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
220. Id. at 279. Compare Candace S. Kovacic, Remedying Underinclusive Statutes, 33
Wayne L. Rev. 39, 76-80 (1986) (suggesting that repeal of California's pregnancy leave statute
was not the only possible remedy: should that statute be preempted by section 701(k) of Title
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In holding that California's pregnancy leave act was not pre-
empted by the PDA, the Guerra Court reviewed the history of the
PDA. Prior to its enactment, the Supreme Court reviewed two cases
in which employers provided disability insurance that covered all
conditions except pregnancy. One of the cases, Geduldig v. Aiello,221
involved a governmental employer and was reviewed under the Equal
Protection Clause. The other case, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,22
involved a private employer and was reviewed under Title VII. In
both cases the Court held that discrimination against pregnant
women was not sex-based discrimination. The Court reasoned that
women are found in both of the compared classes: pregnant people
and non-pregnant people. 213 In Geduldig, the result of this reasoning
was that the discrimination was reviewed under rational basis equal
protection analysis, not gender-based heightened scrutiny. 24 The
Court held, in the context of a disability plan that had resulted in
equal expenditures for men and women, that the pregnancy exclusion
was a rational method for the employer to hold down the costs of
disability coverage. 225 Pregnancy was a unique condition.22 6 In
Gilbert, the Court held that discrimination against pregnant women
was not an unlawful employment practice covered by Title VII
because Title VII prohibits only discrimination "because of sex.''227
Many commentators criticized one or both of the cases, point-
ing out that there are no men in the category "pregnant people."22 8
VII, the Court could have ordered the statute's leave extended to others needing short-term
leave provisions for physical inability to work). The Supreme Court in Guerra noted that the
California statute did not prohibit employers from offering the leave to other employees. See
Guerra, 479 U.S. at 286-89.
221. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
222. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
223. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135-36, 138.
224. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-95.
225. Id. at 495-97.
226. Id. at 496 n.20. The dissent in Geduldig noted that other "voluntary" conditions were
covered by the plan, as were conditions unique to men. Id. at 499-500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
228. See Steven Lee Lapidus, Note, Pregnancy Discrimination, Equal Compensation and
the Ghost of Gilbert. Medical Insurance Coverage for Spouses of Employees, 51 Fordham L. Rev.
696, 709-11 (1983) (discussing congressional rejection of Gilbert by the enactment of the PDA
and quoting congressional committees' recognition that the capacity to become pregnant is the
primary distinction between men and women). For criticisms of the Courts conclusion that
discrimination against pregnant women is not discrimination on the basis of sex, see Minow,
101 Harv. L. Rev. at 40-43 (cited in note 55); Marjorie Jacobson, Note, Pregnancy and
Employment. Three Approaches to Equal Opportunity, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1019, 1032-42 (1988);
Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 30-32 (cited in note 30); Wendy S. Strimling, Comment, The
Constitutionality of State Laws Providing Employment Leave for Pregnancy: Rethinking
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Congress reacted by amending Title VII with the addition of the PDA,
quoted above, which was later at issue in Guerra. Congress made
clear by passing the PDA that for purposes of Title VII the definition
of discrimination "because of sex" included discrimination because of
pregnancy, overturning the reasoning of Gilbert. Congress also over-
turned the result of Gilbert by requiring that employers include cover-
age for pregnancy in their benefits packages. In Guerra, the Court
held that the PDA did not preempt the California pregnancy leave law
because the PDA was "a floor beneath which pregnancy disability
benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not
rise."22 9 The Court reasoned that Congress had passed the PDA to
overturn Gilbert legislatively and had not intended to prohibit states
from requiring employers to provide pregnancy benefits.230
2. United States v. Virginia Effectively Overrules Geduldig v. Aiello
Although the challenge in United States v. Virginia involved
neither pregnancy nor Title VII, the opinion cites Guerra in its sum-
mary of equal protection analysis as an example of permissible gender
classifications. 231 By doing so, the Court recognizes that pregnancy
affects men and women differently. Such a recognition by the Court
indicates that it no longer accepts the reasoning that because not all
women are pregnant, discrimination against pregnancy is not
discrimination against women. This signals a rejection of Geduldig's
reasoning.
Further, United States v. Virginia held that Virginia violated
the Constitution by discriminating against "some women."232
Discrimination against pregnant women is discrimination against
"some women." Thus, the citations to Guerra and United States v.
Virginia's reasoning in this regard should indicate that the constitu-
tional analysis of pregnancy in Geduldig is no longer valid.
When Congress passed the PDA,2 33 it was unable, of course, to
reverse Geduldig's constitutional holding. While the Court has not
decided another constitutional challenge to pregnancy policies not
involving abortion since Geduldig, five justices reaffirmed the
Geduldig After Cal Fed, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 171, 208-10 (1989); Brown, Parmet, and Baumann, 36
Buffi L. Rev. at 577-79, 604 (cited in note 38).
229. 479 U.S. at 280 (citation omitted).
230. Id. at 286-87.
231. 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
232. See Part 1.C.2.
233. See Part IV.A.1.
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reasoning in Geduldig in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic234
in 1993. Bray held that a federal civil rights conspiracy statute 35
does not provide women seeking abortions with a federal cause of
action against people who obstruct access to abortion clinics. 36
Among other reasons for that holding was Justice Scalia's discussion
of Geduldig's holding that discrimination against pregnancy is not
discrimination against women.2 37 Therefore, people who obstruct
women's access to abortion clinics are not conspiring to deprive the
women of the equal protection of the laws because they are women.2 38
United States v. Virginia raises a question about the continu-
ing validity of Geduldig, notwithstanding Bray. Geduldig was not
crucial to the result in Bray, 39 nor was Justice Ginsburg a member of
the Court when Bray was decided. She was appointed seven months
later, replacing Justice White, one of five justices in the Bray
majority.
Assuming that Geduldig is no longer good law after United
States v. Virginia, governments can no longer discriminate against
pregnant women. Governments should, as will be explained more
fully below, make institutional alterations so that expectant women
are not worse off than expectant men when each has a child.240
234. 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
236. Bray, 506 U.S. at 267-68.
237. Id. at 271.
238. Id. at 270 ("The record in this case does not indicate that petitioners' demonstrations
are motivated by a purpose ... directed specifically at women as a class .... "). Justice Stevens,
in a dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, replied that Geduldig needed to be read in context,
saying "[c]entral to the holding in Geduldig was the Coures belief that the disability insurance
system before it was a plan that conferred benefits evenly on men and women." Id. at 327-28
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. The Court in Bray reasoned that animus against women in general cannot be found
from animus against women seeking an abortion because opposition to abortion does not
necessarily mean "opposition (or paternalism) towards women ... as is evident from the fact
that men and women are on both sides of the issue." Id. at 270. Thus, the reasoning that
discrimination against pregnant women is not sex discrimination is not necessary to the holding
in Bray. People on both sides of the abortion issue include men and women and pregnant and
nonpregnant women.
240. See Parts IV.B. and C.
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B. United States v. Virginia Applies to TitleI
1. Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment Use the
Same Definition of Equality
Not only does the citation of Guerra indicate that United States
v. Virginia's reasoning is applicable to constitutional pregnancy cases,
but the citation also indicates that United States v. Virginia's
reasoning is applicable to Title VII pregnancy cases. That reasoning
includes requiring institutional alterations to achieve equality
between the sexes. That reasoning is also consistent with the dictum
in Guerra implying that pregnancy leave is required, not merely
permitted, by Title VII. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, said,
"[b]y 'taking pregnancy into account,' California's pregnancy
disability-leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have
families without losing their jobs." 241 This statement acknowledges
the fact that women, unlike men, need to take time off when they
have a baby. Thus, if an employer has no pregnancy leave policy, a
man will not have to choose between having a job and having a child;
a woman will. 42 It could follow from this dictum that private
employers must provide pregnancy leave if women are to be treated as
equals of men.2 43 Providing job protection for job interruption is not
novel: employers must provide leave for military absence.
24
241. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289.
242. See Part II.B.2.
243. See Kay, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 31 (cited in note 30) (arguing that pregnancy
leave is required by both Title VII and the Constitution); Novkov, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change at 172 (cited in note 58). See, for example, Rhode, Justice and Gender at 120 (cited in
note 29); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1227 (cited in note 28); Rodensky, 10 Harv. Women's L. J.
at 228 (cited in note 58); Patricia M. Wald, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: A Reaction, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 603 (1996) (contrasting women who need to make a choice between career and
family with men who have wives at home and do not have to make that choice); Morrison, 36
Ariz. L. Rev. at 998 (cited in note 29). See also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d
811 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment and holding, inter alia, that a leave of no
more than ten days could disparately impact pregnant women). But see Troupe v. May Dep't
Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the PDA "does not, despite the urgings
of feminist scholars .... require employeis to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make
it easier for pregnant women to work"); Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 479
U.S. 511, 518 (1987) (holding that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, which prohibits denying
benefits because of pregnancy, permits denial of benefits to an employee who voluntarily quit
work because of pregnancy).
Over ten years ago, Wendy Williams critiqued the theory that Title VII requires pregnancy
leave, believing that the theory would justify the Court's reasoning in Geduldig by emphasizing
women's "extra" needs. Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 366-69 (cited in note 29)
(discussing Krieger and Cooney, 13 Golden Gate L. Rev. at 525-31 (cited in note 38); Andrew
Weissman, Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
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While the issue of how to achieve equality was not before the
Court in Guerra, it was in United States v. Virginia. The VMI case
held that the male-only admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 245 As discussed above, 246 this case did not order
women to be admitted to VMI as it functioned at the time of the
litigation. Instead, it required VMI to adjust physical skills require-
ments and alter housing arrangements to provide women with the
same opportunities that men have at VMI.47 That remedy appears to
affirm the consequence foreseen by Justice Marshall's majority opin-
ion in Guerra by requiring institutional alterations to accommodate
both genders equally.2 48
In addition, while the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
differ with respect to their coverage, they are similar in their re-
quirement that men and women be treated equally. For example, if
any employer covered by Title VII stated that women could not be
admitted to the workplace, as VMI did in its admissions policy, the
employer would be liable, as VMI was liable, unless the employer had
a defense of a bona fide occupational qualification.249 The Title VII
defendant would have the burden of proving that defense, just as VMI
tried, unsuccessfully, to prove that the male-only admissions policy
690, 717 (1983)). Since that time, Guerra has characterized, without denigrating women,
pregnancy leave as an employment practice that makes women equal to men. See Guerra, 479
U.S. at 284-85. United States v. Virginia cited Guerra with approval. In fact, it appears that
United States v. Virginia has effectively overruled Geduldig. See Part IV.A.2.
Professor Williams also feared litigation focusing on a state's interest in women's
reproductive roles could justify excluding women from hazardous workplaces. Williams, 13
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 371-72 (cited in note 29). See text accompanying notes 93-98
(discussing the negative ramifications of the Supreme Coures progressive Muller opinion). This
was a real fear in the 1980s as Johnson Controls demonstrates. The Seventh Circuit held that
Johnson Controls's employment practices did not violate Title VII, International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th Cir. 1989), but the Supreme Court reversed, Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. at 200. Thus, the fears of the last decade have been put to rest.
Professor Williams's last criticism is that other workers will be resentful of pregnant
women's "special" privilege. Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 368-69 (cited in note
29). A requirement that pregnant women be given leave, however, may lead to more liberal
leave policies across the board. See notes 370-73 and accompanying text. Professor Williams
would use a disparate impact theory to incorporate pregnancy leave into other worker
protections. Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 368-69 (cited in note 29). See also
notes 294 (discussing scholars advocating the use of disparate impact), and 220 (discussing this
author's agreement with the desirability of providing leave for all).
244. See note 50.
245. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
246. See Part II.C.3.
247. See id.; United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2281 n.15, 2284 n.19.
248. See text accompanying note 241.
249. See Part HI.C.1.
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was necessary for its institutional identity.250  Thus, one could
theorize that the same definition of equality applies in mandating
"equal protection of the laws" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 251 or
prohibiting "unlawful employment practice... because of sex" under
Title VII.252
In fact, the majority in Gilbert, applying the reasoning of
Geduldig2 53 to Title VII, concluded that "the Fourteenth Amendment
standard of discrimination is coterminous with that applicable to Title
VII."254 The dissenters in Gilbert disagreed, seeking a higher defini-
tion of equality under Title VII.255 At the least, then, the lowest
common denominator agreed upon by all in Gilbert is that Title VII
provides as stringent a definition of equality as does the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One could theorize, therefore, that United States v. Virginia's
model of capability combined with institutional alteration for
celebrated, inherent differences between the sexes applies to Title VII.
Distinctions between schools at issue in United States v. Virginia, and
workplaces at issue in Title VII,256 would be taken into account, not by
having different definitions of equality for different institutions, but
by considering different defenses.2s7
For over thirty years, courts in Title VII cases have been
requiring employers to hire and promote women who are capable of
doing the work. Thus, part of the equality model of United States v.
Virginia has long been implemented under Title VIIs requirement
that employers not discriminate "because of sex." Now, under the
analysis of United States v. Virginia, nondiscrimination "because of
sex" should also require that institutional alterations accommodate
celebrated differences between men and women. Just as a remedy in
the VMI case saying "admit women," with nothing more, would not be
a complete remedy,258 so too Title VII remedies saying "hire" or
"promote" women, with nothing more, have not been complete
remedies. After thirty years of "equal treatment" under Title VII,
250. See Parts III.C.1. and 3.
251. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a).
253. See notes 221-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gilbert and Geduldig.
254. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133-34.
255. Id. at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Schools exist to educate students. The workplace is more complicated. Its primary
purpose is not to care for the employees, although an employer may choose to do so. The
workplace's primary purpose is to produce goods or services for its customers. It needs to
generate revenue from those customers to pay the employees and other business expenses.
257. See notes 362-65 and accompanying text.
258. See Part II.C.2.
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there is still a wage gap 59 and a "glass ceiling.260 Though the causes
of these gaps are the subject of debate, 2 1 it is a fair assumption that
lingering discrimination and a workplace that does not adjust to
celebrated differences between the sexes are significant factors.262
That raises the issue as to exactly what the celebrated, inherent
differences are and how the workplace can alter and adjust for them
while still maintaining productivity.
259. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
Series P60, Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1992
(U.S. G.P.O., 1993) (stating that in 1992 women earned seventy-one cents for every dollar
earned by men); J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1190
(1992) (reporting that women without career interruptions earn only 69% of what men earn);
Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 825-26 (cited in note 29).
260. For a thorough study of the glass ceiling for women in one profession, see generally
Epstein, Sautd, Oglensky, and Gever, 64 Fordham L. Rev. (cited in note 35).
261. See, for example, Nancy K. Kubasek, Jennifer Johnson, and M. Neil Browne,
Comparable Worth in Ontario: Lessons the United States Can Learn, 17 Harv. Women's L. J.
103, 103 (1994) (arguing that the wage gap is caused "by men's greater opportunities for
education, training and work experience," women's choices to take "traditionally female jobs,"
and women's decisions to take time out to have children); Anne C. Levy, Sexual Harassment
Cases in the 1990s: 'Backlashing" the "Backlash" Through Title VII, 56 Albany L. Rev. 1, 48-49
(1992) (arguing that gender-based harassment and the effects it has on women may be one of
the major causes of the glass ceiling); Paul Weller, The Wages of Sex The Uses and Limits of
Comparable Worth, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1728, 1787 (1986) (arguing that the wage gap is caused by
continuing responsibility of women for childcare); Branch, 1 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol. at 121-38
(cited in note 43) (asserting that a variety of factors contribute to lower wages for women); Gail
C. Kaplan, Pay Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of Comparable Worth into Employer
Liability Under Title VII, 21 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 305, 306-07 (1987) (same); Joan Williams, Is
Coverture Dead- Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 Geo. L. J. 2227, 2237-39 (1994) (stating
that women's family responsibilities help explain the pay gap); Randall K- Filer, Male-Female
Wage Differentials: The Importance of Compensating Differentials, 38 Indus. & Labor Relations
Rev. 692 (1995) (suggesting that women's choice of jobs with more non-pecuniary benefits and
fewer physical risks than jobs chosen by men partly explains the wage gap); Jane Friesen,
Alternative Economic Perspectives on the Use of Labor Market Policies to Redress the Gender
Gap in Compensation, 82 Geo. L. J. 31, 37-38 (1993) (same); Solomon W. Polachek, Occupational
Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure, 63 Rev.
Econ. & Stat. 60, 64 (stating that women choose jobs that enable them to leave the workforce).
But see Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1559, 1594-632 (1991) (suggesting that "choice" is the wrong description for women's
decisions to devote time to family because the decision is made in the context of current societal
role expectations for both men and women). For those who argue that women's choices to raise
children cause adverse employment consequences, one could answer that the workplace needs
to be restructured to avoid imposing adverse consequences for those who have children. See
Part IV.C.
262. See Epstein, Sautd, Oglensky, and Gever, 64 Fordham L. Rev. at 378-414 (cited in note
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
2. Celebrated Differences Between the Sexes Under Title VII
a. Pregnancy
Inherent differences between the sexes, United States v.
Virginia says, "remain cause for celebration."263 Sex classifications
can be "used to compensate women 'for particular economic disabili-
ties [they have] suffered,' to 'promot[e] equal employment opportu-
nity,' [and] to advance full development of the talent and capacities of
our Nation's people."264 Guerra supports the latter statement that
sex-based classifications can be used to promote equal employment
opportunity to maximize talent.265 The inherent difference involved in
Guerra is pregnancy, and the statute involved protects the jobs of
pregnant women. 266 It follows from United States v. Virginia's citation
of Guerra in its discussion of celebrated differences that pregnancy is
a "celebrated" difference requiring institutional alterations.267
It also follows that pregnancy is a celebrated difference when
one analogizes pregnancy to physical strength, another celebrated
difference in United States v. Virginia. Both pregnancy and physical
strength involve biological differences between men and women.
Fewer women than men have considerable upper body strength. Few,
if any, women can give birth to a child without needing any leave from
work,265 while men can have children without a pause. If the muscle
density and upper body strength differentials between men and
women can justify requiring institutional adjustments to achieve
equality, then it is all the more clear that reproductive differences can
justify such adjustments. Most men have more muscle density and
upper body strength than most women, but some women are stronger
than some men. No man, however, can be pregnant, and no man
must take time from work to deliver his child.269 Thus, pregnancy is a
263. 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
264. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
265. Id. (citing Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289).
266. 479 U.S. at 277.
267. See Part 1.C.3. As discussed above, celebrated differences between the sexes do not
make one sex or the other inferior. See notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
268. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
269. Many men may wish to attend the delivery, but a man's presence obviously is not
physically necessary in order for the child to be born. This Article does not advocate that leave
not be given to men, or not be given to all disabled workers. If employers are going to be stingy
with leave, though, they must at least provide it for the physical necessity of having a child in
order for women to be on equal footing with men. See Part IV.C.1.
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more "inherent" and also perhaps a more "celebrated" difference than
is upper body strength.
b. Parenting
Just as pregnancy can be analogized to strength, parenting can
be analogized to privacy. The differences between men and women
with respect to both are based in part upon biological differences and
in part upon social mores. The biological basis of privacy is obvious.
The cultural aspect is seen by comparing traditional gatherings of
men and women with others in some societies and in some circum-
stances in which nudity of both sexes together is not taboo and does
not endanger either sex. 70 Parenting, too, has both biological and
societal components. The parenting difference between men and
women that is based on biology is clear at the time of birth and during
breast feeding.271 The ability, however, to care for a small child or
take a sick child to the doctor is not biologically determined. 2 2 These
tasks and others are currently performed disproportionately by
women.
273
While privacy is a gender-neutral concept, United States v.
Virginia requires VMI to make alterations to accept the privacy con-
cerns of women 274 because VMI was designed for men. VMI has tra-
ditionally provided barracks living for its cadets, all of whom were
male, because part of the adversative method included lack of privacy
at all times.275 By requiring institutional alterations for privacy,
United States v. Virginia recognizes that an institution designed for
one gender, such as VMI, cannot defend the exclusion of the other
gender because of its self-selected gender-based design unless the
design is necessary for achieving an essential purpose. Just as VMI
was designed for one gender, the modern workplace was also initially
designed predominantly for one gender.276 As VMI needs to change to
270. Note, for example, Finnish saunas, Japanese baths, certain tribal life, nudist colonies,
and nude beaches on the Riviera, in the United States, and elsewhere. See Burton Caine, The
Dormant First Amendment, 2 Temple Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 227, 234 (1993).
271. Even if one argues that both parents can feed an infant breast milk if it is expressed
and stored, see note 32 and accompanying text, it is still the mother who needs time and privacy
to express the milk and facilities in which to store it.
272. See Fisk, 2 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 93 (cited in note 68); Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev.
Law and Soc. Change at 354 (cited in note 29).
273. See note 281.
274. 116 S. Ct. at 2284 n.19.
275. See Part II.A.
276. See note 279 and accompanying text.
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consider privacy concerns, so too the workplace needs to change to
consider the parenting concerns of the previously excluded gender.277
Parenting, like privacy, is a gender neutral term. In order for
a court to order workplace alterations based on Title VII, the court
must find discrimination based on sex, not parenting. An order for
institutional alterations for parenting would be a two-step process. 278
First, alterations would be ordered for mothers for reasons discussed
below. Then, also discussed below, the alterations would be ordered
for fathers because men cannot be treated differently from women.
The reason motherhood is a celebrated difference under United
States v. Virginia's analysis is that the modern workplace, with its
generally inflexible time and presence demands, is designed predomi-
nantly for men with wives at home to take care of children and other
domestic needs of the family.279 As more women enter the workforce,
they are not acquiring "wives."20 Nor are men typically shouldering
half of the domestic work.281
277. See note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of institutional design. See Part
IV.C for a brief discussion of how the workplace could make alterations.
278. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983)
(using "[a] two-step analysis" to demonstrate that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibits
discrimination against pregnant employees and then that discrimination against a female
spouse would discriminate against a male employee); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions:
Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1179-80 (1991)
(discussing the gendered structure of the workplace).
279. See, for example, Dowd, 54 Fordham L. Rev. at 700 (cited in note 43); Okin, Justice,
Gender and the Family at 8-13 (cited in note 54) (discussing false gender neutrality in
contemporary political theory and in notions of justice); Williams, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 822-23,
836-42 (cited in note 54) C'the ideal worker"); Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 327,
331, 353 (cited in note 29) ("the 'real' workers"); Littleton, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1280 n.2 (cited in
note 39); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1186, 1189, 1191, 1195, 1221 (cited in note 28); Finley, 86
Colum. L. Rev. at 1126 (cited in note 55). The poor, often racial minorities, have rarely had the
economic ability to allow the mother to stay home with the children and have had to make
alternative arrangements for childcare. See Mary Frances Berry, The Politics of Parenthood.
Child Care, Women's Rights, and the Myth of the Good Mother 39-41 (Viking Press, 1993). See
also notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
280. See generally Terri Apter, Working Women Don't Have Wives: Professional Success in
the 1990s (St. Martin's Press, 1993).
281. See Deborah J. Swiss and Judith P. Walker, Women and the Work/Family Dilemma:
How Today's Professional Women Are Finding Solutions 21 (John Wiley & Sons, 1993); Arlie
Russell Hochschild, The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home (Viking
Press, 1989); Dowd, 54 Fordham L. Rev. at 705-06 (cited in note 43); Linda Haas, Equal
Parenthood and Social Policy: A Study of Parental Leave in Sweden 1-3 (State U. of New York,
1992) (discussing the biological and social reasons why more women care for children than
men); Littleton, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1334 (cited in note 39) ('[R]eassigning childcare has not thus
far meant assigning it to men or even sharing it with them; it has meant assigning it to poorer
women."). Apparently because so many studies have shown that women do more childcare than
men, whether for biological or societal reasons, the Family and Medical Leave Act codified that
as a finding. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) ("[D]ue to the nature of the roles of men and women in
our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such
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Workplaces, therefore, that treat fathers and mothers equally
by ignoring the fact that the demands of the home disadvantage
mothers. As mothers try to be "super women" trying to do two jobs,
one at work and the other at home, they may fall behind in one or the
other sphere. If they fall behind at home, the children or marriage
may suffer, and there is probably dust under the bed and unpaid bills.
If they fall behind at work, they lose pay, prestige, or job security.
These work losses, in general, are ones that men with children do not
suffer, at least not to the same degree.282 Women, more than men,
therefore, must make choices between work and family. As noted
above, succeeding at work at the cost of not having children is a very
high price to pay for economic autonomy and security, a price
typically not paid by men.28 3 As with pregnancy, if an employer does
not adjust for the fact that many workers raise children, women with
children will be disadvantaged more than men with children.
Therefore, until the workplace makes it possible for men and women
to reallocate the division of labor in the family, 84 motherhood should
be seen as a celebrated difference between the sexes requiring the
alteration and adjustment analysis of United States v. Virginia to be
applied under Title VII.
While the portion of mothering that is not based on biology is
celebrated, it is not inherent. It deserves, however, the United States
v. Virginia institutional alteration analysis because, until society
changes, socially entrenched differences are as real as biological
ones.285 In addition, United States v. Virginia does not limit its
analysis to inherent differences. It cites Califano v. Webster286 in its
discussion of permissible sex-based classifications. Webster involves
redressing past economic discrimination that is societally based.
Employers may argue that they are not responsible for reme-
dying societal discrimination under Title VII, only their own inten-
responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of
men.").
282. See note 44 and accompanying text.
283. See note 45 and accompanying text.
284. See Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L.& Soc. Change at 333-54 (cited in note 29); Branch, 1
Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y at 119 (cited in note 43) (arguing that women will not be equal until
the workplace accommodates parenting and men can choose to commit to family).
285. See Fisk, 2 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 94 (cited in note 68). See also Swiss and
Walker, Women and the Work/Family Dilemma at 185 (cited in note 281) ('Until men do their
share at home.. . women will never be on a level playing field in their professions."); Littleton,
75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1296 (cited in note 39) ("[E]liminating the unequal consequences of sex
differences is more important than debating whether such differences are 'real' . .
286. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
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tional discrimination. As they have argued in "comparable worth"
cases that it is the marketplace, and not the employer,27 that deter-
mines discriminatory wage rates, so too may they argue that it is
society, not the employers, that has structured the family. That
argument cuts too far, however, because society also created the dis-
crimination that Title VII is designed to eradicate. In addition, even
if a majority of the Supreme Court would accept the marketplace
defense in comparable worth cases, 288 those cases are distinguishable
from parenting cases. The comparable worth cases may not have
been successful in the Courts of Appeals because judges cannot agree
as to which jobs should be compared. Thus the courts would leave
that task to the legislature. 289
With respect to pregnancy and parenting, the classes for com-
parison are clear: men having children are compared with women
having children, and men raising children are compared with women
raising children. Without workplace recognition that employees raise
children, Title VII has a cruel and tantalizing residue. Title VII's
purpose is to make women equal with men in the workplace. It has
succeeded in changing the structure of the workplace in part by
enabling women to enter it. Women are now in the paid workforce in
far greater numbers and in a far greater number of jobs than ever
before.290 But what are women to do with their childrearing role if
men do not or cannot shoulder their share of childrearing responsibili-
ties because of inflexibility in the workplace? The answer is in the
workplace.
Once there is an order requiring institutional alterations to
accommodate parenting,2 1 those alterations would need to be
287. Compare American Nurses'Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986).
288. This issue has not been addressed by the Supreme Court.
289. Judith Olan Brown, Phyllis Tropper Baumann, and Elaine Millar Melnick, Equal Pay
for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 127
(1986) (discussing why plaintiffs have failed to recover under comparable worth); Norman
Vieira, Comparable Worth and the Gunther Case: The New Drive for Equal Pay, 18 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 449, 476-82 (1985) (discussing the difficulties in comparing jobs). Compare Kaplan, 21
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. at 322-31 (cited in note 261) (asserting that comparisons can be made).
290. Marjorie Whigham-Desir, Business & Child Care, Black Enterprise 86, 86 (Dec. 1993)
(reporting that demographers predict that women will comprise 57% of the new entrants in the
job market and 50% of the workforce by the year 2005); Rochelle Kass, Back-Office Bankers
Benefit From Qn-Site Child Care, Bank Systems & Tech. 26, 26 (Mar. 1993) (reporting that
approximately 60% of the mothers of the 14 million preschool children in this country are now
employed full-time outside the home). See also Mikel Glavinovich, International Suggestions for
Improving Parental Leave Legislation in the United States, 13 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 147, 163-
64 (1996); Mona Schuchmann, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative
Analysis with Germany, 20 J. Corp. L. 331, 340 (1995).
291. For a discussion of the types of institutional alterations and adjustments to
accommodate parenting, see the next section.
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extended to fathers for any characteristic that is not biologically
based. The Constitution and Title VII do not permit unequal
treatment between the sexes unless necessitated by biology or to
correct past discrimination.292 Because parenting, as opposed to
pregnancy, is not predominantly biologically based, ordering
alterations just for mothers would perpetuate the stereotypes that the
alterations should alleviate. Thus, in a two-step, but simultaneous
process, United States v. Virginia's analysis, applied to Title VII,
would require workplace alterations and adjustments, first for
mothers, and then for fathers.293
This two-step process is similar to the disparate impact analy-
sis advocated by equal treatment proponents. 294 They argue under
that analysis that employer practices, such as lack of leave, that have
a disproportionate impact on women would be invalidated and
thereby would benefit both men and women. These commentators
have expressed concerns about whether employers would justify their
practices as business necessities and whether courts would order
positive action, such as mandatory leave.295 By borrowing from
constitutional race cases, United States v. Virginia does order positive
action. Because its equality analysis can be read as applicable to Title
VII,2 96 and because section 706(g) of Title VII gives courts broad
authority to order positive injunctions, 297 a court could order work-
292. See, for example, Schafer v. Board, 903 F.2d 243, 247 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
childrearing leave provided to women must be provided to men). The Family and Medical Leave
Act makes this point in its section on purposes. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4).
293. For a reference to the Court's use of a "two-step analysis," see note 278.
294. Riva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 94 Yale L. J. 929, 940-56 (1985); Melissa Feinberg, After California Federal Savings and
Loan Assn v. Guerra: The Parameters of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 31 Ariz. L. Rev.
141, 150 (1989) (showing that some courts have used disparate impact analysis to strike down
policies that violate the PDA); Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the
Workplace, 25 Stetson L. Rev. 1, 42 (1995) (stating that disparate impact analysis can be used
whenever pregnant workers are disfavored). Fisk, 2 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 107 (cited in
note 68) (arguing that employers could be required to provide child care under Title VII
disparate impact analysis, which would benefit both men and women); Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change at 366-69 (cited in note 29); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1191, 1226-30 (cited
in note 28). See also note 244.
295. See, for example, Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 364-74 (cited in note
29); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1226-27 (cited in note 28).
296. See Part IV.B. 1.
297. Section 706(g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful unemployment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
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place changes under Title VII. What changes are necessary, how
many of them a court could realistically be expected to order, and
which are more appropriate for legislation are considered below.
C. Institutional Alterations and Adjustments Suggested Under
Title VII
1. Pregnancy
a. Types of Alterations and Adjustments
For pregnancy, paid leaves and other adjustments will be
required.298 As Justice Marshall indicated in Guerra, job protection
after the birth of a baby helps put new mothers on an equal plane
with new fathers in the workplace.s9 Job security, however, is not
enough. Mothers and fathers will not be equal in the workplace until
mothers do not lose either jobs or pay while recuperating from the
birth of a child. Fathers lose neither when their children are born.
Many states and the federal government have passed statutes
mandating pregnancy leaves. For example, the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993300 mandates that employers having fifty or more
employees provide unpaid pregnancy leave for up to twelve weeks
each year.301 Unfortunately, however, the statute does not mandate
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay .... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(g).
298. For articles discussing accommodations for pregnancy, see D'Andra Millsap, Note,
Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 32 Houston L. Rev. 1411 (1996) (arguing that the ADA's reasonable
accommodation provisions can apply to pregnancy); Laura Schlictmann, Comment,
Accommodating Pregnancy-Related Disabilities on the Job, 15 Berkeley J. Employment & Labor
L. 335, 365-88 (1994) (arguing for the need for pregnancy leave and on the job accommodations
for pregnancy); Matzzie, 82 Geo. L. J. at 218-35 (cited in note 39); Calloway, 25 Stetson L. Rev.
at 1 (cited in note 294) (arguing that pregnancy leave and on the job accommodations for
pregnancy are required to protect the health of children); Dowd, 54 Fordham L. Rev. at 699
(cited in note 43) (arguing for maternity leave); Issacharoff and Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at
2214-16 (cited in note 43) (same); Dowd, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 79 (cited in note 58)
(outlining the need for maternity and paternity leave); Mason, 29 J. Family L. at 45-48 (cited in
note 42) (arguing for maternity leave).
299. See note 242 and accompanying text.
300. 29 U.S.C. § 2610 (1994 ed.). While statutes mandating employers to protect the jobs of
pregnant women who take leave to have children are relatively new, statutes mandating that
employers protect jobs for people, historically men, who take leave for military service are not
new. See note 50.
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paid leaves. In addition, not all states have mandatory pregnancy
leave statutes,30 2 and the federal act does not affect the majority of the
workforce, as most businesses have fewer than fifty employees. 30 3
While some employers voluntarily provide benefits,30 4 many do not. 05
The logical consequence of United States v. Virginia and
Guerra is that a court under section 706(g) of Title V11306 could order
reinstatement and backpay for a mother fired for taking time off from
work to have a baby. A court could also enjoin the employer from
continuing to treat new mothers differently from new fathers. A court
faces two hurdles in ordering this relief. First, such an order is a
departure from some of the legislative history of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. Second, a court may believe that a legislature is
the appropriate body to authorize pregnancy leaves.
b. Departure from Legislative History of the PDA
When Congress passed the PDA to overturn the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilbert and to require employers to include preg-
nancy in their already established benefit plans,307 the Senate and
House Reports both contained statements that the PDA would not
require employers to start providing benefits. 308 The second provision
301. Lack of pay for leave does not help the poor, and carries an assumption that women
are dependent upon men. See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint
for Family Leave, 30 Harv. J. on Legis. 335, 343 (1993) (saying that lack of wage replacement in
the FMLA "reinstitutionalizfes] patriarchy ... and preserv[es] racial and class privilege");
Marion Craim, Confronting the Structural Character of Working Women's Economic
Subordination: Collection Action vs. Individual Rights Strategies, 3 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 26
(1994) (stating that lack of wage replacement assumes "female dependence on a male bread
winner").
302. See Schlictmann, 15 Berkeley J. Employment & Labor L. at 394-99 (cited in note 298)
(discussing state statutes and regulations that accommodate pregnancy).
303. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks: The Cost of Neglecting Our Children
227-28 (Harper Perennial, 1991) (stating "that 95 percent of all employers and 44 percent of all
employees" are not covered by the FMLA); Issacharoff and Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at
2190 (cited in note 43) (same).
304. See note 330.
305. See Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks at 227 (cited in note 303) (stating that only 20%
of women are employed by companies offering family support benefits); Issacharoff and
Rosenblum, 94 Columbia L. Rev. at 2190 (cited in note 43) (stating that small employers not
covered by the FMLA are also less likely than large employers to provide family benefits).
306. See note 297 for the text of section 706(g).
307. For a discussion of the passage of the PDA, see Part IV.A.1.
308. Justice White, dissenting in Guerra, quoted from both Reports. The Senate Report
states: "Mhe bill rejects the view that employers may treat pregnancy and its incidents as sui
generis, without regard to its functional comparability to other conditions." Guerra, 479 U.S. at
298 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 95-
331, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1977)). The House Report stated: "[Tihis legislation... does not
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in the PDA, that pregnant women "shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work," can be read consistently with the
legislative history to mean that if no leave is given to any employee,
none need be given to new mothers. A court order requiring an
employer who provides no leave to reinstate, with back pay, a woman
fired for having a child would be inconsistent with that legislative
history and statutory language. Guerra, however, has undercut this
reading of the PDA by emphasizing the broad purpose of Title VII and
noting that, in passing the PDA, Congress focused on prohibiting em-
ployers from excluding pregnancy from benefits plans. Because of
Congress's focus on ending discrimination, Guerra explicitly held that
the second provision of the PDA did not limit the remedies available
under the first provision.30 9
One could also give a new reading to the second sentence of the
PDA to make it consistent with Title Virs broad purpose as discussed
in Guerra. One could compare new mothers with new fathers, inter-
preting the PDA as follows: "Women affected by... childbirth (new
mothers)... shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes... as other persons not so affected (new fathers are not
affected by childbirth as are new mothers) but similar (some mothers
and fathers both have new children)." The word "similar" is the com-
parative word. This reading, strained though it may be, is consistent
with the statement of the purpose of the PDA given by one of its
sponsors, Senator Williams. He said: "The entire thrust... behind
this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate
require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner with respect to
providing sick leave... [and] in no way requires the institution of any new programs where
none currently exist' Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Based on Pregnancy, H.R. Rep. No. 95-
948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978). Justice White stated that "[t]here is only one direct reference
in the legislative history to preferential treatment. Senator Brooke stated during the Senate
debate: 'I would emphasize most strongly that S.995 in no way provides special disability
benefits for working women. They have not demanded, nor asked, for such benefits. They have
asked only to be treated with fairness, to be accorded the same employment rights as men."'
Guerra, 479 U.S. at 300 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 29664 (Sept. 16, 1977)).
309. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285. The majority said: 'The reports, debates, and hearings make
abundantly clear that Congress intended the PDA to provide relief for working women and to
end discrimination against pregnant workers. In contrast to the thorough account of
discrimination against pregnant workers, the legislative history is devoid of any discussion of
preferential treatment of pregnancy, beyond acknowledgments of the existence of state statutes
providing for such preferential treatment." Id. at 285-86. The Court also noted that Senator
Brooke's statement, see note 308, was his opinion. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 286 n.20. The Court
also said: 'The meaning of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second
clause, which explains the application of the general principle to women employees." Id. at 285
(quoting Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678 n.14.)
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fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the funda-
mental right to full participation in family life."31 Guerra quotes
Senator Williams's statement to support its holding that the
California pregnancy leave statute enables women and men alike to
have both jobs and families. 311
There is other precedent ignoring statutory language that is
inconsistent with Title VIrs broad purpose. The majority in Newport
News Ship Building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC312 so analyzed Title VII.
At issue in Newport News was whether the PDA required an employer
to provide wives of employees with the same pregnancy benefits that
it provided to female employees. The dissent argued that the word
"individual" in section 703(a)(1) mandated equal treatment only for
employees, not for spouses. 3 3 The majority held, however, that
without the same benefits to wives of employees, the male employee's
family, as a unit, would not be equal to the female employee's family,
contrary to the purpose of Title VII.3'4 Newport News, therefore,
stands for the proposition that one method of equal treatment, even if
supported by the letter of the law, does not necessarily provide
equality. Applying this proposition to pregnancy, one sees that while
a lack of leave in one sense treats all people equally, it produces
inequality.
There is also precedent for courts to articulate theories of
liability and concomitant remedies not specified explicitly in Title VII
but based on its broad purposes. Most recently, after some lower
courts dismissed similar claims, the Supreme Court recognized an
action for sexual harassment under Title VII.315
310. 123 Cong. Rec. 29658 (Sept. 16, 1977), quoted in Guerra, 479 U.S. at 288.
311. 479 U.S. at 289. See also Part IV.A.1.
312. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
313. The dissent refers to the language of section 703(a)(1) which prohibits discrimination
"because of [an] individuars... sex," and says "the word 'individual' refers to an employee or
applicant.... As modified by the first clause of the [PDA] ... [t]his can only be read as
referring to the pregnancy of an employee." Newport News, 462 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
314. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 683-84.
315. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Earlier cases in which sexual harassment claims had been
dismissed include Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (sexual behavior is personal); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases
123 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd as Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding employer not
liable for sexual harassment of employee); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (sexual harassment at work is not
job related). For an interesting discussion about the implications of the Supreme Court's
1997]
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The most obvious example of judicial recognition of a theory of
liability not specified explicitly in Title VII is the disparate impact
theory of employment discrimination 16 created in 1971 in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 317 and codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.318
That theory was created to fulfill the "objective" of Title VII and to
eliminate "built in head winds" slowing the achievement of that objec-
tive.319 Chief Justice Burger, for a unanimous Court, wrote that
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em-
ployment practices, not simply the motivation";30 therefore, employ-
ment practices having a disparate impact on a class protected by Title
VII are unlawful, whether or not an employer intended to discrimi-
nate by using them. This disparate impact theory was judicially cre-
ated despite language in the remedial section of Title VII providing a
remedy only where the employer has "intentionally" discriminated.
321
Griggs did not discuss that provision of Title VII. Griggs also created
a defense of business necessity for the disparate impact doctrine, also
now codified in Title VII.32 2 Thus, court-ordered paid pregnancy leave
under Title VII is not inconsistent with the court-ordered action in
Griggs.323 In fact, some have argued that pregnancy leave is required
under Griggs because the lack of leave creates a disparate impact on
women.
324
c. Judicial or Legislative Orders
Another hurdle for a court seeking to order pregnancy leave to
make new mothers equal with new fathers is the fact that pregnancy
leaves are typically statutory creations.3 25 While a court could look to
the alterations and adjustments ordered in United States v. Virginia
recognition of sexual harassment as an action under Title VII, see Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at
1197-220 (cited in note 28).
316. See Part III.C.2.
317. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(k).
319. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
320. Id. at 431. Justice Brennan took no part in Griggs.
321. Section 706(g) provides: "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
322. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2).
323. The remedy in Griggs was to order the employer to stop using certain hiring criteria.
The remedy in pregnancy cases would be affirmative-order leave. But the remedy could be
articulated in the negative-stop having policies (no leave) that penalize women who have
children.
324. See note 294.
325. Military leaves are also statutory. See note 50.
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for authority to order pregnancy leave to equalize men and women, a
court might be reluctant to impose, in a statutory case, a remedy
ordered in a constitutional case without explicit statutory authority.
One answer to such reluctance is the broad statutory remedial
language of section 706(g) of Title VII, which permits a court to order
"affirmative action" such as reinstatement, hiring, and back pay, "or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."326 It is
possible, however, if courts were to use that broad language to order
paid pregnancy leave, that the Supreme Court might overturn them
as it did when courts required employers to make accommodations for
employees' religious belies.3 7 On the other hand, it is possible to
argue that the case reversing court ordered religious accommodations
was wrongly decided, as evidenced by Congress's restoration of the
results of the reversed cases. Thus, it could be further argued that
courts would be correct to order paid pregnancy leaves under Title VII
to achieve its broad purpose.
While a court might be concerned about its authority to order
paid pregnancy leave, Congress would have no such concern, having
recently enacted mandatory pregnancy leave as part of the Family
and Medical Leave Act.328  Because that act has been favorably
received by the public, 32 9 Congress should have the political incentive
to amend it or Title VII to require that employers provide paid
pregnancy leave. While some employers might oppose such an
amendment on the grounds of cost, other employers already provide
paid pregnancy leave because it is in their economic interest to do
326. See note 297.
327. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. u. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
328. 29 U.S.C. § 2610. Among other things, the Family and Medical Leave Act provides
that employers with fifty or more employees must provide new mothers and fathers with up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a baby. This act is expansive because
it covers all parents; it is limited because it provides only unpaid leave and covers only large
employers. See note 301.
329. A weakened version of the FMLA was passed only after two vetoes and a change in
administration. See Ronald D. Elving, Conflict and Compromise: How Congress Makes the Law
(Simon & Schuster, 1995) (describing the history of the enactment of the FMLA). The public's
positive experience with the FMLA could have changed the political climate with respect to
extending it. See generally Schlictmann, 15 Berkeley J. Employment & Labor L. at 400-01
(cited in note 298) (discussing factors favoring passage of additional pregnancy accommodation
laws). Senator Christopher Dodd, who chairs the Family and Medical Leave Commission, has
introduced the "Family and Medical Leave Fairness Ace' to expand the coverage of the FMLA to
apply the employers having twenty-five or more employees, noting that the current law protects
57% of the private workforce and that over twelve million employees have used the provisions of
the FMLA, and that 94% of the businesses incurred little or no additional cost from the FMLA.
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So.330 These employers might welcome the amendment in that it
would eliminate a competitive disadvantage. Nor is it necessarily
clear that paid pregnancy leave would be a burdensome cost for
employers. Some studies show that the costs of replacing workers
and of productivity losses are greater than the costs of providing
pregnancy leave331 If cost were a factor, a pregnancy leave statute
could provide for an insurance pool to spread the costs of paid leave
and substitute employees, as is done for unemployment insurance. 332
In addition, although politically unpopular in the United States at the
moment, government subsidies for pregnancy leave, as are provided
in many other countries,s3s are also an option.
All progressive changes carry some risk of placing employers in
the United States at a competitive disadvantage with employers in
countries without progressive laws or customs. 334 While this may
make passage of progressive legislation difficult, the United States is
not always governed by the lowest common denominator. With
respect to pregnancy leave, however, the United States ranks near the
330. Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks at 26 (cited in note 303) (describing Merck's six
month leave with partial pay and other benefits). See also Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term
Paid Leave: A New Approach to Social Insurance and Employee Benefits, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 465
(1987); Sheila B. Kamerman, Alfred J. Kahn, and Paul Kingston, Maternity Policies and
Working Women (Columbia U., 1983) (describing existing maternity policies). See also note 337
(discussing existing family support benefits some companies are offering). But see note 305
(noting limited number of women working for companies with family benefits).
331. See sources cited in notes 330, 333, 337.
332. See Issacharoff and Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2214 (cited in note 43); Donna
Lenhoff and Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Toward the
Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 39, 53-54 (1994).
333. See, for example, Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The United States 1993 Family and
Medical Leave Act: How Does It Compare with Work Leave Laws in European Countries?, 10
Conn. J. Intel L. 105, 112-35 (1994) (surveying work leave laws of nineteen countries). Paolo
Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understanding of Work, Parenthood, and Gender,
Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 531 (1993) (comparing Italian family
benefits law with that in the United States); Nancy E. Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family: A
Critical Perspective on International Models, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 311 (1989) (describing family
leave policies in France and Sweden). See also Sabra Craig, Note, The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993: A Survey of the Act's History, Purposes, Provisions, and Social Ramifications,
44 Drake L. Rev. 51, 79-80 (1995) (listing maternity leave policies in various European
countries). Bureau of National Affairs, Work & Family: A Changing Dynamic 176-79 (1986)
(providing chart describing statutory rights to family leave in Europe). See also Issacharoff and
Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2215 (cited in note 43) (noting that the use of general
government revenues to pay for leaves would make sense but its "political viability approaches
absolute zero" in the United States); Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 376-79 (cited
in note 29) (describing European plans but believing their implementation to be unlikely in this
country); Fisk, 2 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 95 (cited in note 68) (arguing that governmentally
funded child care is inadequate and not likely to increase).
334. See, for example, Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks at 246-57 (cited in note 303); Susan
Baron Dynerman and Lynn O'Rourke Hayes, The Best Jobs in America for Parents Who Want
Careers and Time for Children Too 38-39 (Rawson Associates, 1991).
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bottom among industrialized Western countries in terms of benefits
offered to workers with families.33 5
2. Parenting
a. Types of Alterations or Adjustments
The institutional alterations and adjustments employers would
need to make to enable mothers to be on equal footing with fathers
and to enable all parents to be on equal footing with the rest of the
workplace are multifaceted.36 Many possible workplace alterations
and adjustments can be made to accommodate parenting. Examples
can be found in "family friendly" policies already instituted by some
employers who have determined that those policies are cost
effective.337 Unfortunately, many employers do not provide these
335. See Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks at 225-26 (cited in note 303); Ellen Zieve, To
Work or Not to Work, and What to do About the Kids?, 3 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 163,
179-81 (1993) (discussing programs in Sweden, France, and Canada). Zieve notes that "America
stands alone with South Africa as the only industrialized nation without formal policies to
enhance the well-being of the family... [while] virtually all [other developed nations] assist
families by offering child care, health care, tax relief or cash benefits." Id. See also Jean Baker,
Child Care Will Uncle Sam Provide a Comprehensive Solution for American Families?, 6 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol. 239 (1990). Haas, Equal Parenthood and Social Policy at 13-14(cited in note 281) (discussing family policies in Sweden); Glavinovich, 13 Ariz. J. Intl & Comp.
L. at 167-73 (cited in note 290) (discussing the inadequacies of the Family and Medical Leave
Act which would be improved by following examples from Canada and Europe). See also
Ginsburg, 10 Conn. L. Rev. at 825 (cited in note 114) (stating that in not having legislation to
help pregnant women, "the United States differs from almost every other western industrial
country').
336. For discussions of workplace accommodations for parenting, see Mason, 29 J. Family
L. at 39.48 (cited in note 42); Gibson, 73 Va. L. Rev. at 1145 (cited in note 28); Issacharoff and
Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2214-20 (cited in note 43); Dowd, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at
79 (cited in note 58); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1220-48 (cited in note 28).
337. Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks at 257-68 (cited in note 303); Dynerman and Hayes,
The Best Jobs in America at 3-89 (cited in note 334). See also John H. Earl, Jr. and Jonathan B.
Wight, Baby-sitting: Good for Business, Mgmt. World 11-13 (Feb. 1986) (reporting that
Nyloncraft, Inc. implemented an on-site childcare center in 1981 that operates twenty hours per
day and provides a 60% subsidy for employees); Gillian Flynn, NationsBank Makes Child Care a
Plus, Personnel J. 25 (Jan. 1996) (reporting that NationsBank recently implemented a plan to
subsidize childcare for non-managerial, lower paid workers because these workers tend to have
the highest turnover rates); Toni A. Campbell and David E. Campbell, Benefits: 71% of
Employers Say They Could Be Part of the Child Care Solution, Personnel J. 84 (Apr. 1988)
(reporting that some employers already offer flexible work schedules and job sharing in an effort
to help families balance work-family problems); Ian Springsteel, It's A Family Affair, Magazine
For Senior Financial Executives 12 (May 1996) (noting that studies reveal increase in family-
friendly policies in the workplace); Roberta Maynard, Child-Care Options for Small Firms, 82
Nation's Bus. 43, 45 (Feb. 1994) (reporting increase in family policies); Jaclyn Fierman, Are
Companies Less Family Friendly?, Fortune 64, 64-67 (Mar. 21, 1994) (reporting that a recent
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benefits.338 Family-friendly benefits include flexible scheduling, a
variety of leaves and childcare. 339  Flexible scheduling includes
flexibility with respect to both the hours and days worked 4° and the
location of work. The latter can include the home as modern
technology makes telecommuting possible for certain types of work.341
Types of leave include hours or days of leave to take care of
sick family members 342 or to attend school functions; leaves of a longer
duration, as are accommodated for military obligations; 343 part-time
work with benefits;34 and job sharing.345 Provision of childcare
includes baby-at-work programs,348 on-site or near-site day care,347 and
survey of U.S. businesses shows that 78% offer childcare support and referral programs; 60%
offer some kind of flexible scheduling; 20% offer elder care programs; and 9% offer on-site
childcare); Jennifer Laabs, Family Issues Are a Priority at Stride-Rite, Personnel J. 48 (July
1993) (describing Stride-Rite's intergenerational child and elder care on-site facility); There Are
No Bedtime Stories Here, Fortune 88 (Aug. 21, 1995) (describing Toyota's on-site 24-hour care
facility that allows children to attend a quality care facility while their parents work); Diane
Harris, Big Business Takes on Child Care, Working Woman 50, 50-51 (June 1993) (reporting
that about 10% of businesses have formal family-friendly childcare programs to help workers,
and when combined with referral and reference programs, about 60% of major corporations and
10% of smaller businesses offer some manner of help). See Bureau of National Affairs, Work &
Family: A Changing Dynamic (1986) (provides examples of family-friendly policies instituted by
U.S. employers).
338. See note 305.
339. See generally Sheila Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, Child Care, Family Benefits and
Working Parents: A Study in Comparative Policy (Columbia U., 1981) (discussing various child
care options). See also Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks at 301-21 (cited in note 303) (arguing
that the government must take a number of actions that value children).
340. Flexible scheduling is known as "flextime." Employees work the same number of
hours per week, but have some flexibility in arranging when they work. For example, a worker
will be required to work during a core block of time during the day (often 10:30 a.m. to 2:30
p.m.), but will be able to stretch forty hours over six days or compress forty hours into four days.
Hassberg, 40 Buff. L. Rev. at 245 (cited in note 38). See also Coalition of Labor Union Women,
Bargaining for Family Benefits: A Union Member's Guide 20 (1986) (defining flextime as an
employee's ability to vary the start, finish, and/or length of the workday or workweek, provided
that the employee work the "core hours" and fulfill a requirement to work a certain number of
hours over a one or two week period).
341. Some employers allow employees to work from home. This is known as "flexplace
work" Carol Ann Diktaban, Employer Supported Child Care as a Mandatory Subject of
Collective Bargaining, 8 Hofstra Labor L. J. 385, 400 (1991).
342. While this Article focuses on parenting concerns, the same issues exist with respect to
elder care and care of other family members. Some employers allow employees to use sick
and/or personal days to attend to family needs, including the care of sick children. Coalition of
Labor Union Women, Bargaining for Family Benefits at 17 (cited in note 340).
343. See note 50.
344. See Mason, 29 J. Family L. at 39-43 (cited in note 42) (discussing the importance of
providing benefits to part-time workers); Ann Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of
Part-Time Work for Women Workers, 52 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 799 (1995) (same).
345. Job sharing is when two people share work responsibilities for one full-time job,
enabling them to reduce their hours. Diktaban, 8 Hofstra Labor L. J. at 400 (cited in note 341).
346. Dawn Gunsch, A Baby-Friendly Company, Personnel J. 16, 16-19 (Apr. 1993)
(describing the '"Babies in the Workplace Policy" at Capsco Sales, Inc. that allows parents to
bring their children up to age six months into work with them); Laura Blumenfeld, She's the
GENDER EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
subsidies for employee procured childcare. An indirect benefit of the
corporate workplace becoming involved in providing childcare is that
the prestige and pay of childcare workers should rise, raising the
quality of childcare. For older children, public school eligibility rules
could be changed, entitling children to go to school either where they
live or where a parent works. In the latter situation, children could
commute with parents, and parents could be nearby to respond to
children's needs. Schools could also provide before-school, after-
school, and summer programs.34
How various adjustments and alterations in the workplace
would fit with tasks that cannot be interrupted, tasks that take ex-
traordinary efforts to achieve within a deadline, tasks that have
emergency schedules, or tasks that are otherwise apparently inflex-
ible, would need to be worked out on a case by case basis. Genuine
inflexibility would need to be distinguished from traditional inflexibil-
ity, and new, more flexible ways of accomplishing old tasks might be
devised. For example, job sharing could make a work-only schedule
into a family-and-work schedule, yet still maintain productivity. 349
Life of the Party, She's Young, a Working Mom, Ethnic, and Oh, Yes, Republican, Wash. Post B1
(Aug. 13, 1996). The Keynote Speaker at the 1996 Republican convention, Representative
Susan Molinari, has a young child, who sat in her father's and grandfather's arms during the
speech and who has a crib in her office.
347. In-house childcare programs are child care centers run by the employer (or contracted
out to a childcare management business) and located on the premises. Parent-run centers are
located on or near the place of employment, but are run by the parents. Consortium centers are
formed by several employers to provide childcare at a location convenient to all of their
employees. Family day care networks are formed when employers contract with local childcare
agencies to recruit and train individuals to become licensed day care providers in their homes.
Diktaban, 8 Hofstra Labor L. J. at 394-96 (cited in note 341). Some employers currently provide
programs to care for school-age children before and after regular school hours and during school
vacations while their parents are at work.
348. While outside the scope of this Article, changes in public school eligibility might help
solve the deteriorating public schools, as parents might increase their involvement in schools
near the workplace. Employers also might become involved in local public schools if their
quality were an incentive for employees to work in the locale.
349. For the individual worker sharing a job, a salary would also be shared. At times,
workers might trade off higher earnings for time with family. Such a tradeoff for people with
higher paying jobs might be beneficial both for children and for the extra worker sharing the
job. Job sharing for all employees could also create incentives to combine work and other
activities as a way to avoid burn-out and maximize life's pleasures.
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b. Judicial or Legislative Orders
Justice Ginsburg implies that the institutional alterations and
adjustments to be made at VMI, pursuant to court orders, would be
alternations in housing and adjustments for physical skills similar to
those made at the United States military academies.350 Thus, she had
a model from which to draw. Courts in parenting cases similarly
could look at what comparable employers are doing to avoid losing
talented workers and to avoid the expense of training new ones. 51 If a
court might be reluctant to order paid pregnancy leave under Title VII
to make women equal with men, however, a court might be even more
reluctant to order some of the workplace alterations described above.
Courts have on occasion issued orders in Title VII cases that
resulted in major workplace restructuring. One example is City of
Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,52 in which a
federal district court ordered employers to stop taking sex into
account in determining the amount of an employee's contributions for
pensions. Noting the drastic change involved, the Supreme Court
refused to make the remedy retroactive. 353 Because courts have
devised elaborate remedies to protect constitutional rights to
desegregate schools, 3 54 and because court-ordered workplace changes
would address the problem of failure to integrate family needs into
the workplace, a court might order, under the Constitution, a
governmental employer to restructure the workplace. A court might
not order the same changes under Title VII, however, even if Title
VII's definition of equality is coterminous with the definition of
equality in the Constitution, without explicit remedial authority.
While theoretically a court might have power under section 706(g) of
Title VII to order major workplace restructuring,355 its remedies are
likely to be more modest, but nonetheless important as a recognition
of parenting rights.
The context in which parenting lawsuits are brought could
determine the appropriate judicial remedies. In a case in which a
violation of Title VII has been found due to an employer's taking
adverse action against a person exercising his or her parenting
responsibilities, a court would be acting on familiar ground in
350. See notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
351. See note 337.
352. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
353. Id. at 721-22.
354. See note 194 (citing school desegregation cases).
355. See note 297.
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ordering remedies such as reinstatement and an injunction against
further offending conduct. The likelihood that the injunction would
include an order that an employer institute on-site day care, however,
is small. Most major workplace adjustments to make mothers equal
in the workplace to fathers likely will need legislative enactment 356 or
voluntary implementation. 357 Obviously, changes involving public
schools could not be ordered in the context of a lawsuit brought
against an employer. The changes would need to be mandated
legislatively and in some geographic regions would require
cooperation among neighboring jurisdictions.
As mentioned above,358 because Congress has had political
success with the FMLA, Congress could amend the FMLA or Title VII
to provide further workplace adjustments for parenting. Some
existing statutes, such as the religious accommodation provision of
Title VII,359 the Americans with Disability Act,360 and the provisions of
356. Legislation would eliminate the need for long and costly litigation and could avoid
making adversaries of employees and employers. Legislatures are usually better able than
courts to design complicated remedial schemes. Legislatures can hold hearings to take
testimony from many different sources. Legislation can be drafted to tailor solutions to of
circumstances, phase in required changes over time, or provide defenses that phase out over
time. Compare Ginsburg, 10 Conn. L. Rev. at 826-27 (cited in note 114) ('If Congress is
genuinely committed to eradication of sex-based discrimination and promotion of equal
opportunities for women, it will ... provid[e] firm legislative direction assuring job security,
health insurance coverage, and income maintenance for childbearing women.").
357. Since a number of employers have already instituted "family friendly" programs, see
note 337, more may do so. Assuming antitrust laws do not prohibit firms from pooling resources
to provide child care and other family benefits, smaller firms may wish to work together.
358. See note 329.
359. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Regulations specify some accommodations that can be made for
religious practices: "voluntary substitutes," "flexible scheduling," "lateral transfer," and "change
of job assignments." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d). Two that might apply to pregnancy or parenting
leaves are flexible scheduling, which includes "permitting an employee to make up time lost due
to the observance of religious practices," and voluntary substitutes. Id. § 1605.2(d)(ii). An
employee taking pregnancy leave, however, presumably will require more time off than an
employee observing religious holidays. Requiring an employee to "make up time," means that a
woman returning after giving birth will not be treated equally with a man whose spouse just
had a child but did not take leave or took only a short leave. While the woman is being treated
the same as the man with respect to work hours, she is not being treated the same with respect
to combining work and parenting.
360. The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees with
disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. "Reasonable accommodation" is defined by regulation as
follows:
(1) The term reasonable accommodation means:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a
qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such
qualified applicant desires; or
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner
or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily
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FMLA,361 could offer guidance. New legislation should go much
further, however, if Title VII's purpose is to be made complete.
Although cost is typically not a defense consideration under
Title VJI, 362 if "family friendly" workplace alterations costs more than
the savings in turnover costs,3 63 an undue hardship defense could be
created, either judicially, just as the business necessity defense was
created in Griggs,364 or legislatively, as has been done in a variety of
statutes. 365 A court or legislature could also determine, however, that
performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform
the essential functions of that position; or
(iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with
a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are
enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
(2) Reasonable accommodation may include but is not limited to:
(i) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(ii) Job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to
a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices;
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials, or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters;
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
(3) To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for
the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified
individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify
the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). See Matzzie, 82 Geo L. J. at 218-35 (cited in note 39) (arguing that the
ADA requires workplace accommodations for pregnancy). See also Schlictmann, 15 Berkeley J.
Employment & Labor L. at 391-94 (cited in note 298) (discussing a limited analogy between
ADA coverage and pregnancy needs).
361. See Part IV.C.1.a.
362. See, for example, Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17 (rejecting argument that higher
retirement contributions required of women are justified by a higher pay-out to women because
Title VII does not contain a cost justification defense).
363. Many argue that family friendly workplace policies are cost effective. See Coalition of
Labor Union Women, Bargaining for Family Benefits at 13 (cited in note 340) CMany employers
are beginning to realize that parental leave is not only an inexpensive benefit to offer but also
can result in considerable financial savings when turnover, absenteeism, and training costs are
considered"). See also Karen Nussbaum, Issues for Working Families, 35 Labor L. J. 465, 468
(1984) (noting that a 1984 survey conducted for the American Management Association found
that more than three-fourths of employers reported that the costs of employer-sponsored child-
care programs were far outweighed by the benefits); Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of
Labor, Child Care Centers Sponsored by Employers and Labor Unions in the United States 2-8
(1980) (reporting that a 1980 survey found that the following benefits were received from family
policies: "greater ability of the company to attract and keep good employees, less employee
absenteeism, a lower job turnover rate, improved employee morale, favorable publicity for the
employer and improved community relations"); U.S. General Accounting Office, Parental Leave
Revised Cost Estimate Reflecting the Impact of Spousal Leave 1-2 (1989) (finding cost of unpaid
leave less than cost of replacing workers).
364. 401 U.S. at 431.
365. Section 701(j) of Title VII, which requires accommodation for religious practices,
provides an undue hardship defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). See also note 359. The
regulations defining religious discrimination provide that upon notification by an employee of a
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no hardship defense is appropriate, or is appropriate only for interim,
transitional periods.
3. "Mommy Track" Concerns
Equal treatment proponents would prefer legislation that
addresses all workplace disabilities.3 66  Some scholar suggests that
employers be required to provide gender neutral "sabbaticals" for a
variety of reasons to enlist broad-based worker support for leaves and
to decrease the chance that employers become reluctant to hire
women or create a "mommy track."36 7 Broad-based employment
reform would be ideal. Waiting for the ideal, however, may
disadvantage women. Failure to provide job security and other
adjustments for parents disadvantages women and may disadvantage
some of them right out of the workplace as they try to "do it all."36
Requiring employers to provide parental leaves will not
necessarily result in women becoming more expensive to hire or
need for religious accommodation, an employer has an "obligation to reasonably accommodate
the individuars religious practices.... [unless] an employer can demonstrate that an undue
hardship would in fact result from each available alternative method of accommodation." 29
C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1). The undue hardship defense is defined by regulation to be "more than a
de minimus cost." Id. § 1605.2(e)(1). That cost is to be determined "in relation to the size and
operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who will in fact need a particular
accommodation." Id. There is a presumption that "the infrequent payment of premium wages
for a substitute" will be a cost the employer will be required to bear. Id.
Another act with an "undue hardship" defense is the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990. The ADA's undue hardship defense is found in the definition section of the ADA, which
defines discrimination to include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Undue hardship is defined as "significant difficulty or expense," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1), which
is presumably more than the "de minimus" amount specified in Title VI's religious
accommodation regulations.
The Family and Medical Leave Act provides an unusual hardship defense. The employer
may use the defense only for "a salaried employee who is among the highest paid 10 percent of
the employees," 29 U.S.C. § 2601, and only if the employer must deny that employee's return
from leave because "such denial is necessary to prevent substantial and grievous economic
injury to the operations of the employer," id. § 2601.
One could note that the expenses the employer must show to avoid accommodation are
becoming greater and greater as one goes from Title VII's religious accommodation defense, to
the ADA's accommodation defense, to FMLA's leave defense. While one might argue that the
FMLA is most analogous to court-ordered leave under Title VII because the FMLA mandates
leave, a highest paid employees defense would have a danger of perpetuating the glass ceiling.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
366. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
367. See, for example, Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1233-48 (cited in note 28).
368. See note 98.
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shunted into a "mommy track." Studies show that as the population
ages, employers are concerned about shrinking labor pools.369 The
interest of these employers may not be served by reducing their pool
of talent, which failing to adjust for parental needs will cause.
Rather, employment policies that are "parent-friendly" may make
employers attractive to both genders. As more two income families
have children, more men and women are realizing that workplace
accommodations for childcare are needed.370 If a "mommy track" did
emerge, perhaps it would be a transitional track until more fathers
took advantage of it. Perhaps in time it may prove not to be a
parental track, but a parental station, one of many along the track.
Instead of trying to solve all problems at once, focusing first on
women's equality needs in the workplace may ultimately lead to a
workplace responsive to all workers.371 Avoiding the pursuit of child-
friendly workplace policies because such policies are perceived as
women's issues could be self-defeating to women by perpetuating,
rather than eliminating, the perceived devaluation of "women's
concerns.372 Both men and women in the workforce are also facing
serious elder care concerns with aging parents, which could create an
additional demand for family-friendly work policies. 373 Although
almost three-quarters of the caregivers are women, the twenty-five
percent who are men represent a large number of people.
4. Reduction of Societally Entrenched Differences Between the Sexes
Requiring institutional alterations to accommodate parenting
under an equality model is initially based on the fact that mothers
typically shoulder more childrearing than fathers do.374 Yet an equal-
ity analysis requires, ultimately, that both sexes be accommodated in
carrying out parenting roles so that neither suffers a disadvantage
due to gender. Once the workplace accommodates mothers, it would
369. See Part lI.B.1.
370. Both men and women in the workforce are also facing serious elder care concerns with
aging parents, which should create an additional demand for family-friendly work policies. See
Susan Levine, One in Four U.S. Families Cares for Aging Relatives, Wash. Post A13 col. 1 (Mar.
24, 1997) (reporting the results of a nationwide survey about caregivers for the elderly and the
costs to the workplace and also reporting that 72% of caregivers are women). See also Nadine
Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 Rev. of Law and Soc. Change 381, 385
(advocating workplace policies to care for the elderly, as well as children and others).
371. See notes 42-45, 279-81 and accompanying text.
372. See note 29 and accompanying text. See also Brown, Parmet, and Baumann, 36 Buff
L. Rev. at 601 (cited in note 38) ("[G]ender equality necessarily requires conditions that support
women's familial responsibilities.").
373. See notes 342, 370.
374. See notes 42-45, 279-81 and accompanying text.
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then need to accommodate parents. 75 Once the workplace accommo-
dates parents, whether as the result of court orders, legislative man-
date, or voluntary action, the differences between the roles of mothers
and fathers should diminish,376 except for those that are biologically
necessary. If the workplace were to accommodate parenting rather
than penalize it, then more fathers might be willing and able to take
on more childcare.
To the extent that mothering and fathering are not based on
biological differences, it may be that mothers do more parenting be-
cause that is the way childcare has traditionally been done. 377 Men
may simply have followed tradition. In order for the tradition to
change, men would need to resist societal role pressures as well as
workplace pressures that present parental obligations as inconsistent
with the obligations of committed workers. 378
In addition, mothers may do more parenting because of the
current gender pay gap.379 Women have traditionally been paid less
than men, and in the aggregate, despite the Equal Pay Act,3 80 this
continues to be the case. Thus, if only one parent retains em-
ployment, it will more than likely be the father. The mother's leave-
taking, then, serves to exacerbate the pay gap.38' If the workplace
were to accommodate childcare without a financial penalty, it could
help eliminate the gender pay gap. It could also encourage fathers to
undertake more childcare. It is hard for individual fathers to chal-
375. For a discussion of extending accommodations from mothers to fathers, see notes 291-
93 and accompanying text.
376. See Fisk, 2 Berkeley Women's L. J. at 97, 103, 108 (cited in note 68). See also notes
291-93.
377. Of course there have been a number of traditions, varying with place and time, class
and culture. See Williams, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 354-55 n.117 (cited in note 29).
378. Hassberg, 40 Bufi L. Rev. at 238 (cited in note 38) (reporting that men are reluctant
to take paternity leave because of employer bias against men who use this benefit); Novkov, 19
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 171 (cited in note 58) (discussing underutilization of paternity
leave in Sweden).
379. See note 259.
380. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994 ed.). The Equal Pay Act does not address wage discrepancies
between jobs predominantly held by women and those predominantly held by men.
381. See Issacharoff and Rosenblum, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 2161-62 (cited in note 43)
(reporting that "work history patterns" explain much of the gender pay gap); Meredith K.
Wadman, Mothers Who Take Extended Time Off Find Their Careers Pay a Heavy Price, Wall St.
J. B1 (July 16, 1992). Some studies have found that the gap between men's and women's
earnings narrows over time for women who reenter the workplace. See Mary E. Corcoran, Work
Experience Labor Force Withdrawals, and Women Wages: Empirical Results Using the 1976
Panel of Income Dynamics, in Cynthia B. Lloyd, et al., eds., Women in the Labor Market
(Columbia U., 1979); Jacob Mincer and Haim Ofek, Interrupted Work Careers: Depreciations
and Restoration of Human Capital, J. Human Resources 3 (Winter 1982). See also note 43.
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lenge the workplace if they will jeopardize the family income, which
already may have been jeopardized by the mother's parenting.
Challenges to the workplace by both parents may put the family at
economic risk.
Even if economic and other workplace barriers to parenting are
reduced or eliminated, psychological ones presumably will remain.3 82
While those are significant barriers, they are more likely to be over-
come once they are uncoupled from economic barriers. Allocation of
work in the home is difficult to change while governmental and work-
place policies penalize parenting by ignoring parenting and children.
Thus, changes in the workplace making it more hospitable to par-
enting may enable parents to allocate family responsibilities more
equally. Where the disparate allocation is biologically necessary, then
no change in family allocation will occur. Where the disparate alloca-
tion of family work is societally imposed, a change in society,
beginning with the workplace, could be a starting place for change in
the family.
Workplace change should also benefit children.383 When the
workplace ignores children's need for parental attention, it puts
parents in a conflict between their work and their children.84 Many
have called for a reorganization of the workplace to integrate fami-
lies. 385 United States v. Virginia's equality analysis and citation to
Guerra could be a catalyst for this reorganization.
The fact that some adjustments are necessary in the workplace
does not mean that women are less capable workers than men. It
merely means that the industrial workplace was based on a model
wherein someone other than the wage worker takes care of children
382. See, for example, Martin A. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1047,
1049 (1994); Novkov, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 155 (cited in note 58).
383. See Mason, 29 J. Family L. at 44 (cited in note 42) (noting that children benefit when
parents work fewer hours). See generally Penelope Leach, Children First (Vintage Books,
1995).
384. See Arlene Johnson, The Business Case for Work-Family Programs, J. Accountancy 53,
53-54 (Aug. 1995) (noting that parents may have to choose between work and their children if
their employer requires them to stay late or work an extra day); Diktaban, 8 Hofstra Lab. L. J.
at 389-90 (cited in 341) (finding affordable child care poses an enormous problem for working
parents).
A recent Department of Labor study explains further: "Conflicts arise between work and
family responsibilities because our system of child care services does not provide the needed
reliable care and because work requirements often do not allow the flexibility that parents need
to provide care and emotional support for their children" Women's Bureau, Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, Employers and Child Care: Benefiting Work and Family 8
(1989). A sample survey reported that child care problems were the "most significant predictors
of absenteeism and unproductive time at work." Id. at 7.
385. See note 58 and accompanying text.
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and takes care of them without pay. 86 The once male-dominated
workplace has changed. Most women now work in it. 387 Women's
work now has an economic value. That means that the employers,
who used to be able to take advantage of a "free" resource, childcare,
to support its workers, now need to recognize that the resource is no
longer free.388 The employer has come to realize this in other contexts,
recognizing that other "free" resources, such as air and water, are not
really free. Employers now pay to use these resources by developing
technology to keep them clean. So, too, they will need to pay in some
manner for childcare.
V. CONCLUSION
The effect of United States v. Virginia is remarkable. It raises
gender equal protection analysis to the strict scrutiny level. Its less-
restrictive-means analysis requires courts to determine whether
institutions can make alterations and adjustments to avoid excluding
women. In addition, United States v. Virginia's citation to Guerra
suggests that its analysis applies to Title VII, and that Title VII's
pregnancy analysis applies to the Constitution. In all respects, the
decision has far-reaching implications for restructuring the workplace
to recognize and accommodate the parental need to raise children.
Just as VMI, built for one gender, must now adapt to new views about
women's roles and abilities, so too must the workplace adapt. Had
the workplace initially been designed to include both men and women
and to recognize that most people in the workplace also raise children,
the design would be different today. The analysis in United States v.
Virginia, requiring institutional adjustments and alterations, is a
first step toward achieving the gender-free design necessary for
achieving gender equality in the workplace.
386. See note 279.
387. See note 290.
388. See Scales, 95 Yale L. J. at 1396 (cited in note 45) (arguing that employers must
compensate woment for the benefits that have been gained because of them).
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